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GRAY CLOUD OBSCURES THE RAINBOW: 
WHY HOMOSEXUALITY AS DEFAMATION 
CONTRADICTS NEW JERSEY PUBLIC 
POLICY TO COMBAT HOMOPHOBIA  
AND PROMOTE EQUAL PROTECTION 
Rachel M. Wrightson* 
Homophobia is far too complex a phenomenon to have a 
singular explanation. Gay people are stigmatized by 
several sources, including religion, social mores, and . . . 
the law. Eliminating one cause of stigmatization among 
many may not be a panacea but would be a step in the 
right direction. 
                           — Christopher R. Leslie1 
INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary defamation law has been characterized as 
plagued with infirmities and ripe for reform.2 Modern attempts at 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2003; B.A., Northwestern University, 
1998. The author would like to thank Professor Nan Hunter and the staff of 
the Journal of Law and Policy. She also acknowledges Eric D. Sherman for 
his generous contribution of sources cited herein. 
1 Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by 
‘Unenforced’ Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 105 (2000). 
2 See Robert M. Ackerman, Bringing Coherence to Defamation Law 
Through Uniform Legislation: The Search for an Elegant Solution, 72 N.C. L. 
REV. 291 (1994). According to Ackerman, “one of the most uncertain areas of 
modern American jurisprudence, the law of defamation remains largely a 
mystery to commentators and practitioners alike.” Id. at 291. He further 
stated, “the law of defamation is in disarray. It is confusing. It is unclear.” Id. 
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clarification have unabashedly begun with the assumption that the 
current framework for the law of defamation and libel “isn’t 
working well for anyone.”3 In the context of such confusion, it is 
not surprising that the question of whether calling someone gay is 
defamatory has not been uniformly analyzed or answered by the 
courts.4 In Gray v. Press Communications, LLC,5 the Appellate 
Division of New Jersey determined that an imputation of 
homosexuality is reasonably susceptible to a defamatory 
meaning.6 This comment combines an analysis of relevant 
legislation and caselaw to conclude that Gray was wrongly 
decided. New Jersey’s current legislation and prior court rulings 
do not support the conclusion that reference to an individual as a 
homosexual lowers the community’s estimation of the 
individual’s reputation.7 Additionally, Gray is inconsistent with 
                                                          
at 293. Ackerman’s article reviews the “infirmities that plague contemporary 
defamation law in the United States” and sets forth an analysis of Uniform 
Correction or Clarification of Defamation Act as proposed and withdrawn in 
1993. Id. at 294. 
3 Robert J. Hawley, Libel Litigation: An Overview of the Uniform 
Defamation Act, PRAC. LAW INST. G4-3883, at 645 (1992). Hawley’s article 
reviews a report promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws regarding the proposed Uniform Defamation Act of 
1989. Id. The report set forth a comprehensive model Libel Reform Act, 
designed to “encourage the dissemination of truth in the public realm and 
facilitate efficient resolution of defamation disputes.” Id. 
4 See Randy M. Fogle, Is Calling Someone “Gay” Defamatory?: The 
Meaning of Reputation, Community Mores, Gay Rights, and Free Speech, 3 
LAW & SEX 165, 165 (1993) (noting that “[c]ourts have analyzed the issue 
differently and have reached different results”). 
5 775 A.2d 678 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., 2001), cert. denied, 788 
A.2d 774 (N.J. 2001). The appellate division reversed the trial court’s 
dismissal of plaintiff’s defamation suit and found that a radio call-in show 
host’s characterization of a former host of children’s shows as “the lesbian 
cowgirl” was reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning. Id. at 684. 
6 Id. 
7 New Jersey’s legislature has enacted a number of laws that provide legal 
protection for the rights of gays and lesbians in the state, and New Jersey 
courts have broadly construed many of the state laws to provide redress to the 
lesbian, gay, bi-sexual and transgender individuals. See infra Part II 
(discussing and analyzing a sampling of these enactments and cases). 
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the New Jersey court system’s progressive approach to protecting 
the rights of gays and lesbians, and ultimately has deleterious 
effects upon the state’s concerted effort to promote equal 
protection of gays and lesbians. 
This comment focuses on the extent to which defamation law 
purportedly reflects community standards and on the judge’s role 
in a defamation suit to either condone or condemn societal 
disapprobation of allegedly defamatory characteristics.8 Part I 
reviews the elements of defamation law, the pleading 
requirements in New Jersey for a defamation claim, and 
examines New Jersey legislation and caselaw relevant to issues of 
sexual orientation. Part II places Gray in the context of statutory 
language and caselaw and concludes that Gray was wrongly 
decided because it is inconsistent with the state’s position on 
sexual orientation and the law. This section also argues that Gray 
has a deleterious effect upon equal protection of gays and 
lesbians in society and perpetuates homophobia. Part III proposes 
a model for how the court should have examined the issue in 
Gray to avoid the harmful effects of allowing an imputation of 
homosexuality to be actionable in a court of law. 
I. DEFAMATION LAW AND IMPUTATIONS OF HOMOSEXUALITY AS 
DEFAMATORY 
Defamation has long been viewed as an amorphous, if not 
elusive, tort.9 Throughout history, the legal boundaries of 
defamation law have changed, and conclusions about whether 
                                                          
8 See Lyrissa Barnett Lidksy, Defamation, Reputation and the Myth of 
Community, 71 WASH. L. REV. 1, 17-20 (1996). Lidsky first notes that “the 
prevailing American rule asks whether the statement was defamatory in the 
eyes of a substantial and respectable minority [in the community].” Id. at 17. 
She also states that “[i]dentifying what is respectable encourages judges to 
make normative judgments about the desirability of the beliefs of subgroups 
within the general community.” Id. at 20. See also infra Part I.D (explaining 
judicial discretion in defamation actions). 
9 PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 771-72 (5th ed. 1984). Dean 
Prosser began his discussion of the law of defamation by proposing that “there 
is a great deal of the law of defamation which makes no sense.” Id. at 771-72. 
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allegedly defamatory statements are actionable have varied in 
time and place.10 In certain instances, statements that may have 
been actionable as defamatory per se in one generation or context 
are no longer regarded as defamatory at all.11 For example, 
statements suggesting that an individual is a fascist,12 
Communist,13 or a racist14 were once actionable but are now 
properly dismissed as non-defamatory. The notion that 
religious,15 racial, or ethnic labels are susceptible of a defamatory 
                                                          
10 Thomas F. Daly, Defamation, 19 AM. JUR. TRIALS § 2 (1972); see 
also Fogle, supra note 4, at 172 (noting, “the notion that what is considered 
defamatory is continuously evolving has been widely recognized”). 
11 MICHAEL MAYER, THE LIBEL REVOLUTION: A NEW LOOK AT 
DEFAMATION AND PRIVACY xvi (1987) (noting that “the categories [of 
defamation] change as yesterday’s derogatory phrase becomes today’s 
innocuous aside or even compliment”). 
12 Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding a written 
statement asserting that a periodical and a newspaper column frequently print 
news items and interpretations picked up from openly fascist journals was not 
libelous, since issue of what constitutes an “openly fascist” journal is matter of 
opinion). 
13 Grant v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 151 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1945) (calling a 
lawyer a communist sympathizer was defamatory); Toomey v. Farley, 156 
N.Y.S.2d 840, 845 (1956) (finding that to charge one with being a communist 
or with having communist affiliations and sympathies is defamatory, justifying 
an action for libel); but see PETER F. CARTER-RUCK & RICHARD WALKER, 
CARTER-RUCK ON LIBEL AND SLANDER 37 (3d ed. 1985) (hereinafter CARTER-
RUCK) (noting that “it is probable now that such a statement [of communism] 
would be held to be defamatory. . . . [I]t is essential to consider the attitude of 
the country, as a whole and at the time, to the particular political party of 
which it is alleged the plaintiff is a member.”); see also MARK A. FRANKLIN 
ET. AL., MASS MEDIA LAW 302 (6th ed. 2000) (stating that “‘Communist’ 
seems to have gone from being nondefamatory before World War II to being 
defamatory during the McCarthy era and the Cold War, and perhaps now to 
being nondefamatory again”). 
14 See, e.g., Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 402 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(“Accusations of racism no longer are ‘obviously and naturally harmful.’ The 
word has been watered down by overuse, becoming common coin in political 
discourse.”). For a general examination of categories, see MAYER, supra note 
11, at 33-38. 
15 See CARTER-RUCK, supra note 13, at 37 (noting that calling someone 
Roman Catholic during the reign of Charles II was actionable for defamation, 
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meaning has also been largely rejected.16 For example, in the 
early 1900s false statements that a white person was African-
American were regularly deemed defamatory.17 Although there is 
no caselaw expressly overruling these cases, such suits have 
largely ceased.18 Modern opinions assume that such an allegation 
is not defamatory at all.19 
One commentator interpreted dismissal of these actions as 
judicial attempts to avoid sanctioning discriminatory attitudes.20 
Another unequivocally stated that the range of statements courts 
have labeled as defamatory proves that defamation law is founded 
on social prejudice.21 At a minimum, the fact that judges dispose 
of some defamation claims, rather than submitting questions to a 
jury, “reflect a belief that what is actionable as defamation is 
                                                          
but was not actionable under the reign of James I, and it would not be 
actionable today). 
16 See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Swagerty, 563 P.2d 511, 514 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1977) (“The term ‘nigger’ is one of insult, abuse and belittlement harking 
back to slavery days. Its use is resented, and rightly so. It nevertheless is not 
within any category recognized as slanderous per se.”); Arturi v. Tiebie, 179 
A.2d 539, 543 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1962) (Sullivan, J.A.D., 
concurring) (determining that reference to plaintiff as a “dirty guinea,” a slang 
expression for an Italian immigrant, though crude and objectionable, was not 
defamatory). 
17 See, e.g., Stulz v. Ga. Ry. & Elec. Co., 242 F. 794 (6th Cir. 1917); 
Morris v. State, 160 S.W. 387 (Ark. 1913); Jones v. R.L. Polk & Co., 67 So. 
577 (Ala. 1915); May v. Shreveport Traction Co., 53 So. 671 (La. 1910); 
Mopsikov v. Cook, 95 S.E. 426 (Va. 1918); Spencer v. Looney, 82 S.E. 745 
(Va. 1914). 
18 For further discussion of this phenomenon, see Lidksy, supra note 8, at 
29-33. 
19 See Thomason v. Times-Journal, Inc., 379 S.E.2d 551 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1989) (refusing to concede that plaintiff may have suffered from social 
prejudice of others where plaintiff sued over the publication of a false obituary 
that gave a funeral home listing that catered to a primarily “black clientel 
[sic]”); see also Bradshaw, 563 P.2d at 514 (finding that the term “nigger” 
was not defamatory per se and dismissing claims where plaintiff had not pled 
special damages in accordance with state law); Lidsky, supra note 8, at 9. 
20 Fogle, supra note 4, at 174 (“For example, the law of defamation may 
ignore racism in our society because to do otherwise would sanction it.”). 
21 Lidsky, supra note 8, at 28. 
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freighted with policy considerations.”22 This evolution in the 
categories of defamation illustrates that contemporary courts may 
properly dismiss even those claims that may have been actionable 
in prior eras.23 To a certain extent, a modern court sitting in 
judgment of a defamation suit is entitled to pick and choose 
which cases to entertain and which to dismiss.24 Courts are not 
required to accept social prejudices as they find them.25 
A. Common Law and Constitutional Components of 
Defamation 
Defamation is founded in the twin torts of libel and slander, 
both designed to effectuate society’s “pervasive and strong 
interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation.”26 
At common law, “[t]he gravamen or gist of an action for 
defamation is damage to the plaintiff’s reputation.”27 The law “is 
not concerned with the plaintiff’s own humiliation, wrath or 
sorrow,”28 and “the damages sustained by a defamed plaintiff are 
not to his personal feelings, but rather to those losses which 
accompany an interference with one’s social, business, religious 
or familial relations.”29 A cause of action cannot be sustained 
simply because one feels insulted or angered by an epithet or 
                                                          
22 FRANKLIN, supra note 13, at 305. 
23 See supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text (detailing the evolution 
of the categories of defamatory terms). 
24 Lidsky, supra note 8, at 34. 
25 Id. 
26 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 87-88 (1966) (holding that in order to 
recover for damages allegedly sustained as a result of a news column allegedly 
imputing mismanagement on the part of a public official, the plaintiff was 
required to show that the asserted implication was specifically “of and 
concerning” him, and jury instructions permitting him to recover upon a 
finding merely that he was one of a small group, only some of whom were 
implicated, were erroneous). 
27 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 2 (1995). 
28 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 771. 
29 Id. at 843. 
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statement.30 
As a rule, the common law has not attempted to define 
reputation,31 but substantial effort has been expended to articulate 
the outlines of this elusive concept.32 The harm inflicted upon 
one’s reputation has been characterized as “an impairment of a 
‘relational’ interest, i.e., denigrat[ing] the opinion which others 
in the community have of the plaintiff and invad[ing] the 
plaintiff’s interest in his . . . good name.”33 Put another way, 
“[d]efamation is that which tends to injure the reputation in the 
popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or 
confidence in which the person is held, or to excite adverse, 
derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions about him.”34 It is 
commonly understood that a defamation action affords a remedy 
for damage to one’s general, public image.35 
Further, the generally accepted definition is that “a 
communication is defamatory if it tends to harm the reputation of 
another so as to lower him or her in the opinion of the 
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing 
                                                          
30 Id. 
31 See generally Developments in the Law—Defamation, 69 HARV. L. 
REV. 875, 877 (1956). 
32 See generally Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation 
Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691 (1986). The 
author sketches three distinct concepts of reputation that the common law of 
defamation has at various times in its history attempted to protect—reputation 
as property, as honor, and as dignity—and explores how each weighs in the 
balance against the constitutional interest in freedom of expression. Id. 
33 Lumberman’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. United Serv. Auto Assoc., 528 A.2d 
64, 67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987), construing HARPER & JAMES & 
GRAY, LAW OF TORTS § 5.1 (2d ed. 1986). The court further noted that “the 
mere fact that the plaintiff’s feelings and sensibilities have been offended is not 
enough to create a cause of action for defamation.” Id. 
34 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 773. 
35 See Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Pub. Co., Inc., 516 A.2d 220, 224 
(N.J. 1996) (comparing defamation to an action for product disparagement and 
noting that “defamation . . . affords a remedy for damage to one’s reputation” 
while the latter was characterized as “an offshoot of the cause of action for 
interference with contractual relations, such as sales to a prospective buyer”) 
(internal citations omitted). This assertion was confirmed by New Jersey’s 
highest court. Id. 
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with him or her.”36 To be defamatory, therefore, a statement 
must not only be reasonably calculated to injure the victim’s 
reputation37 but must tend to lower the plaintiff in the opinion of 
respectable members of the community.38 Therefore, to establish 
whether a statement is defamatory, the decision-maker must first 
examine the community in whose opinion the plaintiff claims to 
have been diminished.39 The determination of what constitutes the 
community in which a statement is made is an essential factor in 
assessing defamation liability.40 Although the process of defining 
the boundaries of a “community” and the distillation of the 
values held by “respectable members” therein is difficult, it 
involves crucial public policy decisions that, when not directly 
addressed by the courts, brings a lack of clarity into defamation 
law.41 
In the United States, defamation law is governed by a 
balancing test whereby common law theories of a right to protect 
one’s reputation are measured against constitutional protection of 
the First Amendment exercise of free speech.42 Because of the 
strong interest in uninhibited debate on public issues, courts now 
recognize that the First Amendment protects statements made 
concerning public officials or public figures, unless those 
                                                          
36 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). 
37 See Daly, supra note 10, at § 2. 
38 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 1. 
39 Lidsky, supra note 8, at 7. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 7-9 (suggesting that because defamation plays an important role 
in setting the boundaries of community and choosing between competing 
values, “the determination of community values and community identity 
allows courts to advance policy goals by constructing by fiat a ‘respectable’ 
community that shares little in common with the actual community”). Lidsky 
further argues that instead of constructing an artificial community through the 
defamatoriness determination, courts should make explicit what are essentially 
public policy choices. Id. 
42 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Supreme 
Court first articulated this rule in 1964. Id. New Jersey courts have reaffirmed 
this holding. See, e.g., Lynch v. N.J. Educ. Ass’n, 735 A.2d 1129, 1135-37 
(N.J. 1999); Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 666 A.2d 146, 152-55 
(N.J. 1995). 
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statements are made with knowledge that they were false or with 
reckless disregard of whether they were false.43 With respect to 
public figures, the burden of proof in defamation actions is 
higher than the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in 
other civil actions.44 To satisfy this higher standard, “a plaintiff 
must show by clear and convincing evidence that the publisher 
either knew that the statement was false or published with 
reckless disregard for the truth.”45 This judicially imposed 
standard requires that courts confronted with defamation suits 
brought by public figures apply stricter scrutiny than required in 
other civil actions.46 This higher legal bar functions as an 
additional hurdle for plaintiffs in defamation actions and is an 
important means of protecting and encouraging free speech.47 
B.  Pleading Defamation in New Jersey: Standards and 
Requirements 
Although the basic elements of defamation remain consistent 
from state to state, there are many variations of what constitutes 
sufficient pleading and proof of each element.48 In New Jersey, 
                                                          
43 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. 
44 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-13(f) (West 2002) (“In any civil action 
commenced pursuant to any provision of this code the burden of proof shall be 
by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 
45 Gray v. Press Communications, LLC, 775 A.2d 678, 684 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2001), citing Lynch v. N.J. Educ. Ass’n, 735 A.2d 1129 (N.J. 
1999). 
46 GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 55 
(1996) (“In a typical civil case, a party must prove the elements of his claim 
by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 
47 For a thorough analysis of the potential “chilling effect” of defamation 
law upon First Amendment rights and proposals for reform, see David Boies, 
The Chilling Effect of Libel Defamation Costs: The Problem and Possible 
Solution, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1207 (1995). 
48 See generally James R. Pielemeier, Constitutional Limitations on 
Choice of Law: The Special Case of Multistate Defamation, 133 U. PA. L. 
REV. 381, 384-92 (1985). Pielemeier reviews the variations in state 
defamation laws and examines the constitutional questions that arise in 
selecting the applicable law in multi-state publication and litigation. Id. His 
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principles of common law along with Constitution-based 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court govern libel and 
slander.49 Apart from the statute of limitations, only three 
statutory provisions deal expressly with the law of defamation in 
New Jersey.50 One provision delineates the nature and extent of 
the privilege attaching to “the publication of judicial or other 
proceedings;”51 a second limits the amount of damages 
recoverable from print media defendants in the absence of 
malice;52 and a third relieves a broadcaster from liability for 
statements made by a candidate for public office under specified 
circumstances.53 
In New Jersey, plaintiffs are advised to consider a number of 
factors when drafting a complaint for defamation.54 Among those 
items are residence of the plaintiff and other jurisdictional facts, 
the making of the alleged defamatory statement, the publication 
of the defamatory statement, the inducement, when the statement 
                                                          
article ultimately proposes a model for the choice of law in defamation 
actions. Id. at 434-40. 
49 Introductory Comments, 3 N.J. PL. & PR. FORMS § 23:1 (1997). The 
Supreme Court subjected the law of defamation to the regulation of the First 
Amendment for the first time in 1964. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254 (1964). 
50 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-3 (West 2002). The statute requires that an 
action for defamation be commenced within one year of publication. Id. 
51 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:43-1 (West 2002). Newspapers may publish 
official statements by police department heads and county prosecutors on 
investigations in progress or ones completed by them that are accepted in good 
faith by the publisher. The privileged character of the statements will be a 
good defense to any libel action, unless malice in fact is shown. Id. 
52 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:43-2 (West 2002). Only actual damages may be 
recovered from print media defendants in the absence of malice in fact or 
failure to retract the libelous charge publicly and within a reasonable time after 
having been requested to do so by plaintiff. Id. 
53 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:43-3 (West 2002) A broadcaster is relieved 
from liability for statements made by a legally qualified candidate for public 
office when the broadcast is made under provisions of federal law denying the 
broadcaster the power to censor. Id. 
54 See 3 N.J. PL. & PR. FORMS, Checklist—Matters to Consider When 
Drafting Complaint for Defamation, § 23:2 (West 1997). 
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complained of is not actionable per se,55 and an averment of 
general damages resulting from the publication complained of or 
an averment of special damages, when the matter complained of 
is not defamatory per se.56 In short, a plaintiff is required to 
articulate his or her claim by specifying the statement claimed to 
be defamatory, the context and communication of the statement, 
an explanation of how the plaintiff was affected by the statement, 
and the damage inflicted by the statement.57 
Like many jurisdictions, New Jersey applies a higher burden 
of proof when the plaintiff in a defamation suit is a public 
figure.58 In these instances, there must be proof “that the 
statement was made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge 
that the statement was false or with reckless disregard of whether 
or not it was false.”59 This strict standard applies because the 
public has an interest in obtaining knowledge about public 
figures, and thus such figures should expect information of their 
lives and activities to be broadly disseminated.60 
The threshold issue in a defamation case is whether the 
statement at issue is reasonably susceptible of a defamatory 
meaning.61 It is for the court to determine whether a 
                                                          
55 In such a case, the actionable character of the defamatory statement and 
the manner in which it affects the plaintiff should be shown. Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 The Supreme Court decision in New York Times v. Sullivan is binding 
on all lower courts and has been applied by state courts to require that public 
plaintiffs meet the higher pleading and burden of proof standards established 
therein. See, e.g., Gray v. Press Communications, LLC, 775 A.2d 678, 684 
(N.J. Super. Ct App. Div. 2001). See generally Francis M. Dougherty, 
Annotation, Defamation: Application of New York Times and Related 
Standards to Nonmedia Defendants, 38 A.L.R. 4th 1114 (1985); see also 3 
N.J. PL. & PR. FORMS, supra note 54, at § 23:9. 
59 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). 
60 Id. at 272-73, quoting Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (1942) 
(“The interest of the public [in cases that impose liability for reports of 
conduct of officials] outweighs the interest of appellant or any other 
individual. The protection of the public requires not merely discussion, but 
information.”). 
61 See Gray, 775 A.2d at 683, citing Decker v. Princeton Packet, 561 
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communication is capable of bearing a particular meaning.62 To 
make this determination, statements are construed together with 
their context.63 If a published statement has only one meaning and 
that meaning is defamatory, the statement is libelous as a matter 
of law.64 Conversely, if the statement has only a non-defamatory 
meaning, it cannot be considered libelous, thereby justifying 
dismissal of the action.65 In cases, however, where the statement 
is capable of being assigned more than one meaning, one of 
which is defamatory and another that is not, the question of 
whether its content is defamatory is resolved by the trier of fact.66 
These basic rules seem straightforward at first glance, but in 
fact there are “substantial hurdles” to successfully litigating a 
defamation suit.67 Specifically, litigation is complicated when a 
defendant moves for summary judgment prior to trial. When a 
defendant seeks summary judgment on the ground that a 
statement is not defamatory, the question is presented to the 
                                                          
A.2d 1122, 1125 (1989); see also 3 N.J. PL. & PR. FORMS § 23 supra note 
54. 
62 See Gray, 775 A.2d at 683 (“Initially, the question is one of law to be 
decided by the court.”). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 616. (“The 
court determines what items of harm suffered by the plaintiff as the result of 
the publication of the defamatory matter may be considered by the jury in 
assessing damages; the jury determines the amount of damages to be awarded 
for those items.”). Additionally, “the meaning of a communication is that 
which the recipient correctly, or mistakenly but reasonably, understands that it 
was intended to express.” Id. § 563. 
63 Id. § 616 cmt. d. Comment d. notes the following: 
 In determining the meaning of a communication, words, whether 
written or spoken, are to be construed together with their context. 
Words which standing alone may be reasonably understood as 
defamatory may be so explained or qualified by their context as to 
make such an interpretation unreasonable. So too, words which alone 
are innocent may in their context clearly be capable of a defamatory 
meaning and may be so understood. 
Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Romaine v. Kallinger, 537 A.2d 284, 290 (N.J. 1988). 
66 Id. at 290-91. 
67 Boies, supra note 47, at 1297. 
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judge as a preliminary concern.68 The judge, therefore, is the 
initial arbiter to determine if a jury is required to settle a dispute. 
Practically speaking, this means that a judge will decide whether 
it is permissible for a jury to attach a defamatory meaning to a 
given statement.69 The discretionary element of a potentially 
defamatory meaning is not left entirely to the jury under these 
circumstances, because a judge decides whether a question may 
be submitted to the jury in the first instance.70 
C. Imputations of Homosexuality as Defamation 
The history of imputations of homosexuality as defamatory 
has been exhaustively explored elsewhere.71 For the purposes of 
this comment, a sampling of cases are used to illustrate the 
conclusions reached in various jurisdictions.72 A number of state 
courts have held that an imputation of homosexuality is 
                                                          
68 See infra Part I.B (noting that a threshold issue in any defamation suit 
is whether the statements can be reasonably construed as defamatory and 
pointing out the procedural aspects of a motion for summary judgment). 
69 Judges determine whether an allegedly defamatory statement lowers the 
plaintiff in the eyes of respectable people. See supra Part I.A. This 
determination has been characterized as “an open invitation to judges to assess 
which subgroups . . . are or are not worthy of the law’s attention . . . . the 
judge can brand a community as unworthy of respect by either denying its 
existence or by pronouncing it simply too antisocial for its values to be 
countenanced.” Lidsky, supra note 8, at 20. 
70 Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 666 A.2d 146, 156-7 (N.J. 
1995). In deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the motion judge 
must consider whether the evidential materials presented, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a 
rational fact-finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-
moving party. In a defamation action, the threshold issue is whether the 
language used is reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning. Id. See also 
Decker v. Princeton Packet, 561 A.2d 1122, 1125 (N.J. 1989) (“Initially, the 
question is one of law to be decided by the court.”). 
71 See generally Janet Boeth James, Annotation, Imputation of 
Homosexuality as Defamation, 3 A.L.R. 4th 752 (1981). 
72 See infra notes 73, 74; see also infra Part III (analyzing a defamation 
case from New South Wales, Australia and discussing the relative merits of 
the approach employed). 
WRIGHTSONMACRO4-23.DOC 7/24/02  11:36 AM 
648 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
slanderous per se, actionable without proof of special damages.73 
Alternatively, some courts have found such accusations 
actionable as defamatory per quod and have required proof of 
special damages.74 Although the United States Supreme Court has 
not directly addressed this issue, the question of homosexuality as 
defamation was tangentially addressed in at least two instances.75 
Additionally, at least one court has found that to be called anti-
homosexual is defamatory.76 In short, there is no consensus on 
the issue of whether an imputation of homosexuality is actionable 
                                                          
73 Defamation per se is “a statement that is defamatory in and of itself and 
is not capable of an innocent meaning.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 427 (7th 
ed. 1999). See, e.g., Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303 
(Mo. 1993); Nowark v. Maguire, 255 N.Y.S.2d 318 (2d Dept. 1964); Buck v. 
Savage, 323 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Ct. App. 1959). 
74 Defamation per quod is a statement that “either (1) is not apparent but 
is proved by extrinsic evidence showing its injurious meaning or (2) is 
apparent but is not a statement that is actionable per se.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 427 (7th ed. 1999). See, e.g., Moricoli v. Schwartz, 361 N.E.2d 
74 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Bohdan v. Alltool Mtg. Co., 411 N.W.2d 902 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1987); Morrisette v. Beatte, 17 A.2d 464 (R.I. 1941). 
75 Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 65 n.7 (1966) 
(declining to limit liability in labor disputes to “‘grave’ defamations–those 
which accuse the defamed person of having engaged in criminal, homosexual, 
treasonable or other infamous conduct”); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan argued that the majority opinion was too 
broad because it held that no due process security would exist in a statute 
constituting a commission to conduct ex parte trials of allegedly defamatory 
statements “so long as the statement was limited to the public condemnation 
and branding of a person as a Communist, a traitor, an ‘active murderer,’ a 
homosexual, or any other mark that ‘merely’ carries social opprobrium.” Id. 
at 721. 
76 Vail v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 649 N.E.2d 182 (Ohio 1995). The 
Ohio Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff, a candidate for state senator, 
stated actionable claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress based on a newspaper columnist’s description of her as “dislik[ing] 
homosexuals,” of “engag[ing] in an ‘anti-homosexual diatribe,’” and of 
“foster[ing] homophobia” in an attempt to be elected. Id. at 184. The Ohio 
Supreme Court reversed, finding that the columnist’s statements were 
protected under the Ohio Constitution because they represented a point of view 
that was “obviously subjective” and that “the ordinary reader would accept 
[the] column as opinion and not as fact.” Id. at 184, 186. 
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as defamatory. 
D. Judicial Discretion in Defamation Actions 
In 1986, the Supreme Court ruled again that public figures 
bringing suit for libel must provide clear and convincing evidence 
of actual malice to avoid defendant’s summary judgment.77 Thus, 
the “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard must be applied 
at the appellate as well as the trial level. In light of the necessary 
balance between society’s interest in protecting individuals and 
the interest in promoting free speech under the First Amendment, 
the bar for a defamation claim is necessarily high and “because 
non-meritorious defamation claims have a tendency to 
compromise or chill the exercise of First Amendment values . . . 
a court should not be reluctant to grant summary judgment if the 
defamation claim lacks merit.”78 The extent to which defamation 
law has a chilling effect upon the First Amendment cannot be 
determined with any mathematical certainty. However, at least 
one leading commentator was willing to declare that the effect is 
“significant.”79 The First Amendment balancing test, therefore, is 
rightfully considered alive and well in the courts.80 
Considering the impact upon the media, allowing 
homosexuality to remain on the list of legally offensive terms 
may have the practical effect of deterring press coverage of the 
                                                          
77 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986). 
78 Gray v. Press Communications, LLC, 775 A.2d 678, 684-85 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
79 Boies, supra note 47, at 1208. 
80 Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255-56. 
 [W]hether a given factual dispute requires submission to a jury must 
be guided by the substantive evidentiary standards that apply to the 
case. This is true at both the directed verdict and summary judgment 
stages . . . where the factual dispute concerns actual malice . . . . 
[T]he appropriate summary judgment question will be whether the 
evidence in the record could support a reasonable jury finding either 
that the plaintiff has shown actual malice by clear and convincing 
evidence or that the plaintiff has not. 
Id. 
WRIGHTSONMACRO4-23.DOC 7/24/02  11:36 AM 
650 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
gay rights movement.81 In communities that have passed 
legislation indicating an acceptance of homosexuality, the media 
could justifiably conclude that threat of defamation suits arising 
out of media coverage of gay events is lessened.82 Burdening 
such media outlets with the “chill” of potential litigation would 
therefore be unwarranted. Decisions in defamation suits that take 
local and state legislation into account can facilitate the exercise 
of free speech by sending a clear, consistent message from the 
courtroom to the press room. 
E. Gray in Context 
The fact that defamation law exists to protect one’s 
reputation, taken together with the contention that individual 
plaintiffs in defamation suits are not primarily motivated by 
economic recovery, supports a common understanding that 
defamation suits generally arise when someone is hurt or angry.83 
One can justifiably wonder, then, why a plaintiff who has 
personally appeared in a number of gay pride events, and who 
lives in a community with legislation that strives to eliminate 
discrimination based on sexual orientation should be sufficiently 
hurt and angry to pursue potentially costly litigation based on a 
single statement that she is gay.84 It is also a mystery that a court 
                                                          
81 See Fogle, supra note 4, at 175 (noting that “the threat of defamation 
claims has a similar ‘chilling effect’ on the naming of homosexuals”). As a 
practical matter, it can be assumed that media outlets and resources would be 
unwilling to provide news coverage of an event if that coverage carried with it 
a probable risk of liability in subsequent defamation suits. The mainstream 
press has consistently avoided naming individuals who have been “outed” by 
the gay community, claiming a fear of libel litigation. Id. at 175. Fogle further 
argues that “[t]he chilling effect that defamation suits have on the media 
coverage of outing has dramatic societal implications including using 
defamation suits (1) in the political arena and (2) to support attitudes that are 
contrary to public policy.” Id. at 175. 
82 Id. at 195. 
83 See Boies, supra note 47, at 1209. 
84 See discussion infra Part I.E.1. New Jersey legislation and caselaw are 
remarkably protective of the rights of gays and lesbians under the law. For 
discussion of Sally Starr’s participation in Gay Pride events, see infra Part II. 
WRIGHTSONMACRO4-23.DOC 7/24/02  11:36 AM 
 HOMOSEXUALITY AS DEFAMATION 651 
that once stated that “[i]t is unquestionably a compelling interest 
of this State to eliminate the destructive consequences of 
discrimination from our society” and that evinced a desire to 
“eradicate the cancer of unlawful discrimination of all types” 
would decline to further this goal when presented with the 
opportunity to do so.85 This context of apparent inconsistencies 
generated a judicial decree that now has the dubious distinction of 
further confusing defamation law as well as detracting from an 
effective, concerted effort to further equal protection for gays and 
lesbians.86 
1. New Jersey Legislation 
The legislative history and framework in New Jersey reflects 
a long-standing effort to broaden the scope of the equal 
protection doctrine. The New Jersey Legislature codified its 
commitment to equality by enacting the Law Against 
Discrimination (“LAD”) in 1945, “some twenty years before the 
effective date of [federal anti-discrimination law] Title VII.”87 
The LAD was amended in 1991 to include sexual orientation.88 
New Jersey’s sodomy statute was repealed in 1979.89 The state’s 
                                                          
85 Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1227, citing Peper v. 
Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trs., 389 A.2d 465 (N.J. 1978). 
86 For further discussion of the residual effects of Gray on the clarity of 
defamation law and gay rights, see infra Part II.B.3. 
87 Peper, 389 A.2d at 478. See also 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 
(West 2002). 
88 NJ STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2002). The statute includes “affectional 
or sexual orientation.” Id. It reads as follows: 
 All persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment, and to 
obtain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges 
of any place of public accommodation, publicly assisted housing 
accommodation, and other real property without discrimination 
because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital 
status, affectional or sexual orientation, familial status, or sex, subject 
only to conditions and limitations applicable alike to all persons. 
Id. 
89 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:143-1, 2A:143-2 (repealed 1979). This is 
relevant because some courts have relied on sodomy laws to conclude that an 
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Unlawful Discrimination statute provides legal redress for 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.90 The Prevention of 
Domestic Violence Act affords the same protection to victims in 
a same-sex relationship as in other relationships covered by the 
act.91 New Jersey’s Hate Crimes Law includes sexual 
orientation.92 At a minimum, New Jersey’s current legislative 
framework clearly indicates a desire to protect the legal rights 
and interests of lesbians and gays in the state. 
Furthermore, the mission statement of the New Jersey Human 
Relations Council includes “developing proposals for the State to 
combat crime based on race, color, religion, sexual orientation, 
ethnicity, gender, or physical, mental or cognitive disability.”93 
The council assists other legislative bodies “in [their] efforts to 
foster better community relations throughout the State.”94 The 
executive committee of the council “shall include ten public 
members who shall be representative of the various ethnic; 
religious; national origin; racial; sexual orientation; gender; and 
disabilities organizations [of the] state.”95 By establishing this 
commission, the legislature not only codified the state’s desire to 
“promote prejudice reduction,”96 but also explicitly welcomed—
indeed required—the inclusion of homosexuals in the state’s 
representative government. The commission was charged with 
the mission to eliminate “all types of discrimination” by fostering 
                                                          
imputation of homosexuality is defamatory per se because it infers the 
commission of a crime. See Head v. Newton, 596 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tex. 
1980); Buck v. Savage, 323 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tex. Ct. App. 1959). At least 
one member of the current New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that “the 
1979 repudiation of New Jersey’s sodomy statutes . . . is further evidence of 
the evolution in social thinking about homosexuality.” Dale v. Boy Scouts of 
Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1244 (N.J. 1999) (Handler, J., concurring). 
90 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1 (West 2002). 
91 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-17 (West 2002). 
92 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7 (West 2002). 
93 See N.J. STAT. ANN § 52:9DD-8 (West 2002). The committee was 
established by statute in 1997 to perform planning and coordinating functions 
in conjunction with other legislative organizations. Id. 
94 Id. 
95 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:9DD-8(b) (West 2002). 
96 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:9DD-8(a) (West 2002). 
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“good will, cooperation and conciliation among the groups and 
elements of the inhabitants of the community.”97 
2. Sexual Orientation in New Jersey Courts 
New Jersey caselaw reveals a similar desire to promote equal 
protection of gay and lesbians in the state. New Jersey courts 
have “recognized the arbitrariness of discriminating against 
individuals solely because of their sexual orientation.”98 The high 
court recently reiterated that “New Jersey has always been in the 
vanguard in the fight to eradicate the cancer of unlawful 
discrimination of all types from our society.”99 This same opinion 
declared that New Jersey has “long been a leader” in combating 
the problems faced by gays and lesbians in society.100 Although 
the following list is by no means exhaustive, there are a number 
of landmark cases that illustrate the New Jersey courts’ 
commitment to preventing discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and promoting equal protection for gays and lesbians 
under the law.101 
As early as 1974, the Supreme Court of New Jersey noted 
that the “[f]undamental rights of parents may not be denied, 
                                                          
97 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-10 (West 2002). 
98 Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1228, citing One Eleven 
Wines & Liquors, Inc. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 235 A.2d 12, 
18-19 (1967). In One Eleven Wines & Liquors, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
reversed the suspension and revocation of liquor licenses to three 
establishments patronized by “apparent homosexuals.” One Eleven Wines & 
Liquors, 235 A.2d at 19. The opinion is not entirely a beacon of flattery for 
gays and lesbians, considering the inclusion of a statement that “in our culture 
homosexuals are indeed unfortunates,” but the court did find unpersuasive the 
Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control’s argument that permitting “apparent 
homosexuals” to congregate at a bar threatened public welfare. Id. at 18. 
99 Dale, 734 A.2d at 1227, citing Peper, 389 A.2d at 478. 
100 Dale, 734 A.2d at 1227. 
101 See, e.g., Dale, 734 A.2d at 1196; V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 
(N.J. 2000); In re Change of Name by: Jill Iris Bacharach, 780 A.2d 579 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001.); Enriquez v. West Jersey Health Sys., 777 
A.2d 365 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
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limited or restricted on the basis of sexual orientation, per se.”102 
New Jersey was the first state in the nation to specify that gay 
and unmarried couples will be measured by the same adoption 
standards as married couples, and that no couple will be barred 
from adopting because of their sexual orientation or marital 
status.103 Recently, the Supreme Court of New Jersey applied the 
“psychological parent” doctrine to allow a biological mother’s 
same-sex former domestic partner to qualify as a statutory 
“parent” so that the former partner was entitled to visitation 
                                                          
102 In re J.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90, 92 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1974), aff’d, 362 
A.2d 54 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1976). In a dispute between mother and 
father over the extent of divorced father’s visitation rights, the court held that 
granting visitation rights to homosexual father would serve the best interests of 
the children. Id. It should be noted, however, that the court imposed a 
limitation on the father’s visitation rights based on a finding that “the lack of 
understanding and controversy which surrounds homosexuality, together with 
the immutable effects which are engendered by the parent-child relationship, 
demands that the court be most hesitant in allowing any unnecessary exposure 
of a child to an environment which may be deleterious.” Id. at 97. 
103 See David L. Chambers & Nancy D. Polikoff, Family Law and Gay 
and Lesbian Family Issues in the Twentieth Century, 33 FAM. L.Q. 523, 540 
(1999) (“In a 1997 settlement of a class action law suit, New Jersey became 
the first state in the country with a written agency policy requiring that gay, 
lesbian, and unmarried heterosexual couples be evaluated for joint adoption of 
children using the same criteria used for married couples.”). See also Press 
Release, ACLU, New Jersey Becomes First State to Allow Joint Adoption by 
Lesbian and Gay Couples (Dec. 17, 1997), available at http://www.aclu. 
org/news/n121797a.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2002); Press Release, Gay and 
Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD), New Jersey Press Does 
Justice to Gay Marriage (June 25, 1998), available at http://www.glaad. 
org/org/publications/alerts/index.html?record=954 (last visited Apr. 13, 
2002). In a 1997 judgment, attorneys for the American Civil Liberties Union 
reached an agreement with New Jersey to allow lesbian and gay couples to 
adopt children on equal footing with married couples. Id. For additional same-
sex adoption cases, see, e.g., In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 
A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (permitting “any person” to 
institute action for adoption allows unmarried person, heterosexual or 
homosexual, to adopt (construing N.J.S.A. 9:3-43(a)); In re Adoption of 
Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993) (granting 
lesbian’s petition to adopt biological child of her partner with a conclusion that 
the adoption would be in child’s best interest). 
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rights with the children the couple had raised during their 
partnership.104 By acknowledging the parental and familial rights 
of gays and lesbians, New Jersey courts have expressed an 
interest in protecting homosexual relationships.105 
In Enriquez v. West Jersey Health Systems106 a unanimous 
three-judge panel of the New Jersey Appellate Division ruled that 
an individual who encounters employment discrimination because 
she is transgendered may have a claim under the state’s LAD.107 
                                                          
104 V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000); see also Press Release, 
ACLU, Recognizing Lesbian and Gay Family Relationships, N.J. Appeals 
Court Grants Visitation Rights to Woman’s Former Partner (Mar. 8, 1999), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/news/1999/n030899d.html (last visited Apr. 
13, 2002). 
105 See generally Paula L. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on 
Lesbian and Gay Family Recognition, 5 J.L. & POL’Y 107, 110-12 (1996). 
Ettelbrick noted the following: 
 The struggle of lesbian and gay parents to hold on to custody of and 
visitation with their children has moved many courts to reject 
outlandish stereotypes and to acknowledge that one’s sexual 
orientation is not a predictor of parental ability. A growing number of 
courts and employers have begun to acknowledge the integrity of 
lesbian and gay family relationships by embracing concepts such as 
‘second parent adoption’ and ‘domestic partnership.’ Furthermore, 
courts have extended the definition of ‘family’ to include lesbian and 
gay couples, and the relationships between non-biological lesbian 
parents and the children they raise with their partners have 
increasingly gained recognition in the contexts of adoption, 
guardianship and custody. 
Id. 
106 777 A.2d 365 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
107 Id. The trial court rejected plaintiff’s claim on the ground that gender 
dysphoria could not be a handicap under the LAD. The appellate court first 
detailed what the record disclosed concerning the plaintiff’s gender dysphoria 
or transsexualism, and stated the following: 
 Essentially, plaintiff claimed that she felt like a woman trapped in a 
man’s body from a very early age, and that she was called upon to act 
manly even though she did not feel masculine. This is consistent with 
general clinical findings regarding other transsexuals. Transsexuals 
do not alternate between gender roles; rather, they assume a fixed 
role of attitudes, feelings, fantasies, and choices consonant with those 
of the opposite sex, all of which clearly date back to early 
WRIGHTSONMACRO4-23.DOC 7/24/02  11:36 AM 
656 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
This case is especially relevant because although the LAD bars 
discrimination on the basis of “sex,” the “definitions” section of 
the statute does not include transgendered individuals.108 
Additionally, the plaintiff’s claim of gender discrimination was 
distinct from sex discrimination claims covered by the LAD.109 
The court found other state courts’ decisions excluding 
transsexuals’ gender discrimination claims “too constricted”110 
and adopted a reading that “sex discrimination under the LAD 
includes gender discrimination so as to protect the plaintiff from 
gender stereotyping and discrimination for transforming herself 
from a man to a woman.”111 It is interesting to note that the court 
revived language used in a 1976 case, stating that “a person’s sex 
or sexuality embraces an individual’s gender, that is, one’s self-
image, the deep psychological or emotional sense of sexual 
identity and character.”112 This explicit recognition of sexuality as 
a component of one’s psychological makeup and identity 
indicates that New Jersey courts view sexual orientation as 
encompassing more than behavior or sexual activity. This 
analysis is more comprehensive than some courts have been 
willing to recognize.113 
                                                          
development.  
Id. at 370 (internal citations omitted). 
 The case was remanded for trial both on plaintiff’s gender discrimination 
claim as well as for further determination on whether or not plaintiff had 
gender dysphoria and whether her condition was medically diagnosed to 
qualify as a handicap. Id. at 377. 
108 See 10 N.J. PL. & PR. FORMS § 85A:3 (1996), Employment Relations 
Chapter 85A. Discrimination. “‘Affectional or sexual orientation’ means male 
or female heterosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality by inclination, 
practice, identity or expression, having a history thereof or being perceived, 
presumed or identified by others as having such an orientation.” Id.; see also 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(hh), Law Against Discrimination Definitions (West 
2002). 
109 Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 377. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 378. 
112 Id., citing M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1976). 
113 See generally Fogle, supra note 4, at 181-82. Some courts have 
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The plaintiff in Enriquez also brought an action under the 
portion of the LAD that provides relief for those who suffer 
unlawful discrimination because of a handicap.114 The court 
began by noting that the state’s LAD should be liberally 
construed,115 containing fewer restrictions than the correlating 
federal statute.116 Accordingly, the court determined that New 
Jersey’s legislature did not preclude protection to those with 
gender dysphoria.117 Turning again to other jurisdictions, the 
                                                          
distinguished between sexual orientation and the acts, whether sexual or 
otherwise, that are associated with that orientation, thus declining to state 
explicitly that sexual orientation is an intrinsic part of one’s identity and 
psychological constitution. Id. at 182. (characterizing this as a means of side-
stepping the “difficult issue” in defamation cases and citing, for illustration, 
Buck v. Savage, 323 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Ct. App. 1959), and Mazart v. State, 
441 N.Y.S.2d 600 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1981)). 
 Federal cases construing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in light 
of sexual harassment claims based on gender stereotypes are also highly 
illustrative on this point. Readers interested in this topic are encouraged to 
examine Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), and its progeny. 
See generally Toni Lester, Protecting the Gender Nonconformist from the 
Gender Police—Why the Harassment of Gays and Other Gender 
Nonconformists Is a Form of Sex Discrimination in Light of the Supreme 
Court’s Decision in Oncale v. Sundowner, 29 N.M. L. REV. 89 (1999). 
114 Enriquez v. West Jersey Health Sys., 777 A.2d 365, 379 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2001). The relevant statute in Enriquez was N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
10:5-5(q). Specifically, the court interpreted and applied the portion that 
provides a person can be handicapped if he or she suffers from “mental, 
psychological, physiological or neurological conditions which prevents the 
normal exercise of any bodily or mental functions or is demonstrable, 
medically or psychologically, by accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic 
techniques.” Id. at 379. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 380, comparing 42 U.S.C.A. § 12211(b)(1). The Americans 
with Disabilities Act expressly excludes “transvestitism, transsexualism, 
pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting 
from physical impairments, and other sexual behavior disorders.” Id. at 380. 
117 Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 376 (“Thus, gender dysphoria is a recognized 
mental or psychological disability that can be demonstrated psychologically by 
accepted clinical diagnostic techniques and qualifies as a handicap under the 
LAD.”). For the definition of gender dysphoria set forth by the court, see 
supra note 107. 
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court noted a “split on this issue” in other states,118 and reiterated 
that New Jersey’s statute should be construed to “eradicate the 
evil of discrimination in New Jersey.”119 The court also referred 
to current understanding and approaches to gender dysphoria by 
psychiatrists and medical practitioners.120 This willingness to 
acknowledge new trends in other professional fields aided the 
court’s conclusion that gender dysphoria qualifies as a handicap 
under the LAD.121 This illustrates the merits of judicial decisions 
that incorporate contemporary, evolving research on, and 
acceptance of, issues pertaining to sexual orientation. 
In 2001, the New Jersey appeals court overturned a lower 
court ruling and allowed a lesbian to hyphenate her name to 
include that of her same-sex partner.122 In Bacharach, the court 
remarked that although public policy judgments are essentially 
irrelevant to application for change of name, “to the extent that 
public policy may be gleaned from the actions of our legislature 
and the decisions of our Supreme Court, [there is] no basis for 
declining a name change which would enable an applicant to 
adopt a hyphenated surname to include the name of her same-sex 
partner.”123 Moreover, the court explicitly stated that, in light of 
current legislation and judicial decrees, the legitimacy of same-
sex relationships is “well established by both statutory and 
decisional law.”124 Thus, analysts of the New Jersey Court of 
Appeals can conclude that judges are likely to look toward 
legislation to ensure that their decisions comply with the state’s 
public policy, even when those decisions are admittedly not 
founded in policy considerations. 
Perhaps the most notable example of the New Jersey court’s 
progressive approach towards homosexuality is the Supreme 
                                                          
118 Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 380. 
119 Id. at 10. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 In re Change of Name by: Jill Iris Bacharach, 780 A.2d 579 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
123 Id. at 584. 
124 Id. 
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Court’s decision in Dale v. Boy Scouts of America.125 Although 
the critical question in deciding whether the Boy Scouts violated 
the LAD by terminating Dale’s membership was whether the Boy 
Scouts may be deemed a “place of public accommodation,”126 the 
state supreme court gave substantial consideration to legislative 
history and intent as it pertained to furthering fundamental 
equality and protection of the rights of gays and lesbians in the 
state.127 The court noted that, “at a most fundamental level, 
adherence to the principle of equality demands that our legal 
system protect the victims of invidious discrimination . . . . New 
Jersey has long been a leader in this effort.”128 Construing the 
state’s LAD to cover sexual orientation, they found that “the 
scope of the statute is reflective of the breadth of the underlying 
problems we face as a society.”129 The language and spirit of 
Dale can be reasonably interpreted as indicating the court’s 
interest in placing the state at the forefront of gay rights. That the 
New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision was ultimately reversed by 
the United States Supreme Court further illustrates that the state’s 
courts and legislature seek to provide more protection to gays and 
lesbians than other jurisdictions.130 
II. GRAY CLOUD OVER THE RAINBOW 
Sally Starr Gray, also known as “Our Gal Sal,” has been in 
                                                          
125 Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999). Dale has 
been the subject of a substantial amount of scholarly writing entirely beyond 
the scope of this comment. This reference to the case highlights the New 
Jersey Supreme Court’s analysis as illustrative of the Court’s position on gays 
and lesbians in the state. 
126 Id. at 1208. 
127 Id. at 1207-30. Chief Justice Poritz’s majority opinion in Dale 
provides a comprehensive, thorough analysis of the state’s LAD as it intersects 
with the State and Federal Constitution, as well as how the LAD had been 
construed in prior decisions to effectuate legislative intent. Id. 
128 Id. at 1227. 
129 Id. at 1227 n.15. 
130 Id. 
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show business since the early 1940s.131 In recent years, she has 
complemented her career as an entertainer with personal 
appearances at numerous public events, including events hosted 
by gay and lesbian rights groups and AIDS organizations.132 The 
incident that gave rise to Gray v. Press Communications involved 
a call-in radio show broadcast on a New Jersey radio station.133 
On July 24, 1998, the show focused on children’s television 
shows and callers were asked to discuss their favorite childhood 
program.134 One caller identified the Sally Starr show as one of 
her two favorite shows, and co-host Jeff Diminski commented, 
“That was the lesbian cowgirl I think.”135 When she learned of 
the comment, Starr immediately contacted the program director 
and complained.136 Diminski then retracted the statement.137 
Despite this apology, Starr filed suit claiming that the broadcast 
defamed her. 
                                                          
131 For a colorful and flattering synopsis of Ms. Starr’s illustrious career, 
see “Sally Starr—Biographical Profile,” available at http://www.sally- 
starrshow.com/biography.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2002) (hereinafter 
Biographical Profile). 
132 See Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Respondents at Da2-5, Gray v. 
Press Communications, LLC., 775 A.2d 678 (Sup. Ct. N.J. App. Div. 2001) 
(No. A-004797-99T5) (hereinafter Respondent’s Brief). 
133 The show was co-hosted by Jeff Diminski, who was also named as a 
defendant in the action, and broadcast on FM 101.5, which was licensed by 
Press Communications, LLC. Gray v. Press Communications, LLC, 775 A.2d 
678, 681 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
134 Id. at 681. 
135 Diminiski reiterated, “The lesbian cowgirl, Sally Starr.” For a full 
transcript of the relevant exchange, see id. 
136 Id.at 682. 
137 Specifically, Diminski stated, “It has been very informative today. We 
have learned about sex offenders’ rights. We learned about diamonds. We 
learned that Sally Starr is not a lesbian.” Id. This retraction is relevant because 
New Jersey state law requires that a plaintiff prove either “malice in fact or 
that defendant, after having been requested by plaintiff in writing to retract the 
libelous charge in as public a manner as that in which it was made, failed to 
do so within a reasonable time, shall recover only his actual damage proved 
and specially alleged.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:43-2 (West 2002). 
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A. Gray Road to the Courthouse 
Sally Starr was born in Kansas City, Missouri on January 25, 
1923.138 She made her show business debut when she was twelve 
years old and sang and performed, primarily for live audiences, 
until the late 1940s when she began a career in broadcast radio.139 
Starr’s television career began in 1950 when she began hosting 
the daily children’s show “Popeye Theater.”140 In the mid-1960s 
Starr expanded her career to include appearances in feature films, 
audio recordings, and a series of children’s stories published in 
conjunction with her television program.141 “Popeye Theater” 
was cancelled in 1971.142 Starr’s career currently consists of 
making personal appearances and hosting a three-hour country 
classic radio show.143 Starr has also made public appearances at 
various gay pride events.144 
                                                          
138 See Biographical Profile, supra note 131. Her parents were Charles 
and Bertha Beller. She changed her name legally to Sally Starr in 1941. Id. 
139 In addition to recording commercials for the Pepsi-Cola Company, 
Starr and her husband performed on radio programs such as “Hayloft Hoe-
Down,” which was broadcast from the old Town Hall in Center City 
Philadelphia. Id. 
140 The show was broadcast out of Philadelphia. The format consisted of 
cartoons, comedy acts, and live appearances by such entertainers as Roy 
Rogers and Dale Evans, Chuck Connors, Dick Clark, Jerry Lewis, Tim 
Conway, Jimmy Durante, Nick Adams, and The Three Stooges. Id. 
141 Starr appeared in “The Outlaws are Coming,” the last feature film to 
be made by The Three Stooges at Columbia Pictures, and had roles in such 
movies as “The In Crowd,” “Mannequin On the Move,” and “Holiday 
Journey.” She also performed with Bill Haley and the Comets and recorded 
country and western music on the Haley’s label, Clymax. Id. 
142 Id. 
143 See Gray v. Press Communications, LLC, 775 A.2d 678, 680-81 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). Starr regularly appears at Folk and Family music 
festivals and parades in the New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania area. 
For an updated list of appearances, or to secure a personal appearance of Ms. 
Starr at your business location or event, see http://www.sallystarrshow. 
com/appearances.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2002). Ms. Starr’s radio show is 
broadcast from Vineland, N.J. on 92.1 FM WVLT. See http://www. 
sallystarrshow.com/whatsnew.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2002). 
144 Gray, 775 A.2d at 681. The opinion noted as follows: 
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Prior to trial, a preliminary hearing was conducted to address 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.145 Starr’s attorney 
conceded that she is a public figure and the judge determined that 
she could not prevail without meeting the higher standard of 
“demonstrat[ing] by clear and convincing evidence, that 
defendant’s statement was accompanied by actual malice.”146 The 
trial judge did not address the question of whether or not an 
imputation of homosexuality is defamatory.147 Rather, the judge 
was convinced by defense counsel’s construction of the actual 
malice standard as requiring “reckless disregard” and a “high 
degree of awareness of probable falsity of the statement.”148 
Plaintiff’s counsel attempted to discredit Diminski’s basis for 
belief that Starr was a lesbian,149 while defense counsel posited 
that the high burden of proof did not allow for a flexible standard 
and was not met.150 Because the record did not establish malice 
                                                          
[Starr] also did personal appearances for the AIDS Foundation . . . . 
She also stated that she appeared in the Philadelphia Gay Pride 
Parade, where her participation was limited to riding on the back of a 
convertible and waving to people. Additionally, she made several 
paid appearances at an outdoor festival in Philadelphia, held in 
connection with the Gay Pride festivities. 
Id. The irony of this was not lost on all commentators. See, e.g., Arthur S. 
Leonard, ‘Lesbian’ Still Defames in New Jersey, LGNY, NEWSPAPER FOR 
LESBIAN & GAY N.Y., July 9-19, 2001. 
145 Gray, 775 A.2d at 682. In this context, malice requires that the 
statement was made “with knowledge of the probable falsity of the statement.” 
Id. 
146 Id. 
147 See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 132, at 4-6. It should be noted here 
that both respondent’s brief and respondent’s petition record the spelling of 
defendant’s name as “Jeff Deminki,” while the spelling used in the court’s 
opinion is “Diminski.” For purposes of clarity and consistency, this comment 
uses the spelling employed by the court. 
148 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 132, at Da4. 
149 Plaintiff’s counsel stated that Diminski “found out at a cocktail party. 
He was washing his car, someone made a comment to him. He was at a 
comedy club and he thought he heard something. These were the basis [sic] of 
his belief, if it was actually worthy of belief.” Id. at Da3. 
150 Defense counsel stated, “My colleague says that the reckless disregard 
standard is a mutable standard, is a flexible standard, but it is not, Your 
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“by anything close to clear and convincing evidence,” summary 
judgment was granted.151 
On appeal, Starr argued both that the term “lesbian cowgirl” 
was reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning, and that a 
reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Diminski knew his 
statement was false.152 Despite the fact that plaintiff’s first 
contention was not ruled upon by the trial court, the appellate 
division examined Starr’s claim and agreed that an accusation of 
homosexuality is actionable as defamatory.153 The case was 
remanded on the determination that a reasonable fact-finder could 
conclude that Diminski’s actions constituted actual malice.154 This 
decision, however, precludes future defendants from arguing that 
an accusation of homosexuality is not defamatory because further 
proceedings cannot be inconsistent with the appellate division’s 
opinion.155 Moreover, the defendant’s petition for certification of 
the decision was denied.156 
                                                          
Honor.” Id. 
151 Id. at Da4-5. 
152  See Gray v. Press Communications, LLC, 775 A.2d 678, 681 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). At his deposition, Diminski mentioned three 
occasions in which he had heard plaintiff was a self-identified lesbian, though 
he was unable to identify the individuals who made these statements. Id. 
153 This is significant because it is a well-settled practice that appellate 
courts may decline to address an issue if it was not ruled upon in the first 
instance by the motion judge. Gray, 775 A.2d at 685, citing Subcarrier 
Comm’n, Inc. v. Day, 691 A.2d 876, 882-83 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1997). 
154 Gray, 775 A.2d at 686, cert. denied, 788 A.2d 774 (N.J. 2001). 
155 Id. It should also be noted that, by virtue of stare decisis, the court’s 
statements on this question are binding upon lower courts throughout the state. 
As such, any discussion or further analysis of this matter in New Jersey’s 
court systems is effectively shut down by the court’s minimal treatment of the 
matter. For further discussion, see infra Part II.3. 
156 Gray, 775 A.2d 678, cert. denied, 788 A.2d 774 (N.J. 2001). 
Defendant’s Petition for Certification of and Appeal from Final Judgment with 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey was denied without opinion. Id. 
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B. Gray, Not Black and White 
Gray addressed whether an imputation of homosexuality 
could be defamatory as a matter of first impression for New 
Jersey courts.157 As such, there was no controlling precedent, and 
the court was entitled to arrive at whatever conclusion it deemed 
appropriate. Confronted with the same question, many courts 
have assessed contemporary social mores by way of local and 
state legislation.158 The Gray court did not mention New Jersey’s 
legislative framework, and instead looked to six other 
jurisdictions’ opinions on this issue for guidance.159 The court’s 
reliance upon these decisions, however, was inherently flawed. 
Of those decisions, three were issued in states that either still 
have sodomy laws or had sodomy laws at the time of the 
decision.160 Furthermore, opinions that it found persuasive rested 
                                                          
157 Gray, 775 A.2d at 683-84 (“Our research has failed to disclose a case 
in New Jersey considering whether an accusation of homosexuality is 
defamatory.”). 
158 See, e.g., Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) 
(reversing trial court decision that imputation of homosexuality was slander 
per se and finding “no empirical evidence in [the] record demonstrating that 
homosexuals are held by society in such poor esteem”). To support this 
contention, the court referred to the repeal of the state’s sodomy law, an 
executive order prohibiting anti-gay discrimination in public employment, as 
well as nondiscrimination ordinances in Denver and Boulder, Colorado. Id. at 
1025. The case was remanded to determine whether, in the context that it was 
made, the statement was defamatory at all. Id. at 1026. 
159 Without indicating why it selected these cases, the court cited Thomas 
v. Bet Sound Stage Restaurant/Brett Co., Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 448 (D. Md. 
1999); Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Moricoli v. 
Schwartz, 361 N.E.2d 74 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Bohdan v. Alltool Mtg. Co., 
411 N.W.2d 902 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 
860 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. 1993); Head v. Newton, 596 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. App. 
1980). See also Gray v. Press Communications, LLC, 775 A.2d 678, 684 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
160 This inconsistency was brought to the attention of the supreme court in 
defendant’s petition for certification. See Brief in Support of Appeal and 
Petition for Certification of Defendants-Petitioners/Appellant at 17-18, Gray 
v. Press Communications, LLC, 775 A.2d 678 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., 
2001) (No. 51,813) (hereinafter Petition). 
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upon archaic reasoning that New Jersey’s state law rejected years 
ago.161 
As explained above, the community in which a statement is 
uttered uniquely governs the boundaries of defamation law.162 It 
has long been noted that changes in social sensibilities as well as 
varying judicial attitudes in the fifty plus jurisdictions—federal 
and state—account for sharp contradictions and controversy in the 
determination of what is or is not defamatory.163 Therefore, while 
it is conceivable that decisions from other courts correctly reflect 
the public policy of those jurisdictions, opinions of 
homosexuality vary depending on the region of the country.164 
For example, one could, at the very least, expect that the opinion 
commonly held about homosexuality in Texas in 1980 would 
differ drastically from that in New Jersey in 2001.165 So 
illustrated, the potential for substantial variation in public policy 
between states and across decades surely renders the persuasive 
value of certain defamation decisions questionable at best. The 
Gray court’s decision neither explored what motivated the out-of-
state decisions nor indicated why they would be persuasive.166 
Because defamation suits purport to provide an opportunity to 
                                                          
 For a complete, current list of State sodomy laws, see American Civil 
Liberties Union, State by State Breakdown of Sodomy Laws, available at 
http://www.aclu.org/issues/gay/sodomy.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2002). 
161 New Jersey’s sodomy law was repealed in 1979. See supra note 89. 
162 Fogle, supra note 4, at 172.  
 Therefore, finding that a statement is defamatory at a particular place 
and time should not govern the determination of whether a similar 
statement is defamatory at a different place and time. Instead, the 
impact a particular statement is likely to have on a plaintiff’s 
reputation should be considered in the context in which it is 
published. 
Id. 
163 MAYER, supra note 11, at 34. 
164 Fogle, supra note 4, at 179. 
165 This analogy is not arbitrarily drawn. Of the six cases referenced, the 
Gray court cited to a 1980 case from the Texas Court of Appeals. See supra 
note 159; see also Gray, 775 A.2d at 684. 
166 As noted, the court cited to the cases without explaining why they 
were selected. Gray, 775 A.2d at 684. 
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vindicate one’s harmed reputation, it is essential that courts 
identify the plaintiff’s community and its norms to gauge the 
interaction between the statement uttered and values of the 
audience.167 This does not necessarily render extra-jurisdictional 
opinions entirely irrelevant, but it does indicate that sound 
judicial opinions cannot be furnished in utter absence of 
contextual analysis. 
It is equally well established that the existence of a judicial 
remedy for injury to reputation is entirely a matter of state law.168 
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court held that a plaintiff’s 
“interest in reputation is simply one of a number which the State 
may protect against injury by virtue of its tort law, providing a 
forum for vindication of those interests by means of damages 
actions.”169 The Supreme Court of New Jersey has also explicitly 
rejected the proposition that the state constitution creates a right 
to maintain a defamation action.170 Therefore, to the extent that a 
New Jersey court chooses to authorize a cause of action for 
defamation, it may also limit a plaintiff’s ability to prove his or 
her claim in order to promote other social purposes without 
regard to other states’ conclusions.171 
1.  New Jersey Legislation Regarding Sexual Orientation 
Judicial opinions often refer to state and local legislation to 
determine whether public statements are actionable as 
defamatory.172 There is substantial reason to give great weight to 
                                                          
167 Lidksy, supra note 8, at 1. 
168 Maressa v. N.J. Monthly, 445 A.2d 376, 384 (N.J. 1982). 
169 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976). Since Paul v. Davis, federal 
courts have noted that “the State has created the [defamation] cause of action 
and hence . . . it can limit, modify or perhaps take it away through the 
operation of testimonial privileges, absent any claim of constitutional 
deprivation.” Mazzella v. Phila. Newspapers, 479 F. Supp. 523, 528 
(E.D.N.Y. 1979). 
170 Maressa, 445 A.2d at 384-385. 
171 Id. 
172 See, e.g., Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1991) (examining state and local human rights codes and concluding that “the 
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gay rights legislation to determine community acceptance of 
homosexuality. At least one author has argued that gay rights 
laws indicate both the community’s desires to fully incorporate 
gays and lesbians into the community, as well as a condemnation 
of homophobic behavior.173 It is not unrealistic to conclude that 
legislation passed by popularly elected representatives reflects 
those legislators’ desire to further the governmental interest that 
the law serves.174 The long-standing existence of gay rights laws 
may illustrate a community’s commitment to such issues and 
indicate the community’s acceptance of homosexuality.175 Thus, 
in communities with comprehensive gay rights protection, any 
harm to one’s reputation suffered by an imputation of 
homosexuality would not be inflicted by a majority of citizens 
and could be disregarded as negligible by courts.176 
                                                          
community view toward homosexuals is mixed”); Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d at 312 
(pointing to same-sex sodomy statute to conclude that “despite the efforts of 
many homosexual groups to foster greater tolerance and acceptance, 
homosexuality is still viewed with disfavor, if not outright contempt, by a 
sizeable proportion of our population”); Donovan v. Fiumara, 442 S.E.2d 
572, 575 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that state sodomy statute applies 
equally to heterosexuals and homosexuals and concluding that referring to a 
person as gay is not tantamount to imputing the commission of a crime). 
173 See Fogle, supra note 4, at 188. 
174 See, e.g., Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Center v. 
Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 38 (D.C. 1987) (finding that the Council of 
the District of Columbia “acted on the most pressing of needs when 
incorporating into the Human Rights Act its view that discrimination based on 
sexual orientation is a grave evil that damages society as well as its immediate 
victims. The eradication of sexual orientation discrimination is a compelling 
governmental interest.”). In Gay Rights Coalition, the court reversed the trial 
court’s ruling that relieved Georgetown University of its statutory obligation to 
provide tangible benefits without regard to sexual orientation. Id. at 39; see 
also Fogle, supra note 4, at 185 (“The relevance of state and city laws to 
determine the defamatory nature of the imputation of homosexuality is 
predicated upon the concept that the laws of a given jurisdiction reflect the 
moral values of that jurisdiction.”). 
175 Fogle, supra note 4, at 189. 
176 See Ben-Oliel v. Press Publ’g Co., 167 N.E. 432 (N.Y. 1929) 
(concerning the publication of a newspaper article that contained errors about 
Palestinian customs, which only people knowledgeable about such customs 
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The Gray court did not refer to New Jersey legislation to 
determine community standards on sexual orientation,177 although 
the decision noted society’s increasing acceptance of freely 
exercising one’s sexual preferences.178 Neither did the court 
examine whether the statement actually injured the plaintiff.179 
Yet, the decision now includes homosexuality in the category of 
defamatory statements, regardless of legislative intent. Indeed, 
the entire issue was disposed of in a single paragraph.180 Because 
defamation law is designed to protect a person’s reputation, the 
defamatory nature of a comment must be properly evaluated in 
terms of the person’s reputation in the community.181 Courts do a 
disservice to the clarity of defamation law when the question of 
how homosexuality harms one’s reputation is not given full 
treatment.182 
If the Gray court had examined the state laws, it would not 
                                                          
would likely recognize and thus conclude that plaintiff was a “fraudulent 
ignoramus”). See also Fogle, supra note 4, at 188. 
177 Gray v. Press Communications, LLC, 775 A.2d 678, 684 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2001). After examining how accusations of homosexuality have 
been treated by other jurisdictions, the court conclusively stated that 
“[a]lthough society has come a long way in recognizing a person’s right to 
freely exercise his or her sexual preferences, unfortunately, the fact remains 
that a number of citizens still look upon homosexuality with disfavor.” Id. at 
684. 
178 Id. 
179 Interestingly, if the court had examined this issue, it would have found 
that although Ms. Starr’s complaint sought five million dollars in damages, 
she claimed to have lost no more than $8,000 in cancelled personal appearance 
contracts. See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 132, at 9. 
180 See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 132, at 9. 
181 A similar argument has been made to critique judicial analysis holding 
that because homosexual activity may indicate a lack of chastity in a woman, 
imputation of homosexuality was slanderous without proof of damages. Fogle, 
supra note 4, at 183, citing Schomer v. Smidt, 170 Cal. Rptr. 662, 666 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1980). 
182 Fogle, supra note 4, at 180-84. Fogle further argues that some courts 
have side-stepped the question of how homosexuality damages one’s reputation 
and have disposed of the question by other mechanisms, such as misapplying 
sodomy laws to equate homosexuality to criminal or other distasteful behavior. 
Id. 
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have found support for their conclusion “that a number of 
citizens still look upon homosexuality with disfavor.”183 As noted 
above, New Jersey adopted anti-discrimination laws well before 
the federal government,184 and the legislature has drafted statutes 
that explicitly protect the rights of gays and lesbians in the state 
in myriad areas.185 Americans commonly assume that legislation 
passed by popularly elected representatives embodies the will of 
the majority, if not the populace at large.186 
Specifically, laws prohibiting bias reflect a community’s 
unwillingness to tolerate such behavior. This begs the question 
whether is it truly harmful to reputation to charge variance from 
heterosexual practices, while at the same time society establishes 
laws forbidding discrimination for such orientation.187 At the very 
least, the legal status of gays and lesbians in New Jersey is 
relevant in determining whether the community has accepted 
homosexuals as a group.188 Moreover, if New Jersey’s Law 
                                                          
183 Gray, 775 A.2d at 684. 
184 See supra Part I.E.1 (contrasting New Jersey’s LAD with Federal 
Anti-Discrimination Law Title VII). 
185 See supra Part I.E.1. See also Chris Bull, New Jersey Enacts Nation’s 
Fifth State Bias Ban, ADVOCATE, Feb. 25, 1992, at 15 (reporting that New 
Jersey passed a gay rights bill in housing, employment, public 
accommodations, credit and public contracts). 
186 See generally Nan D. Hunter, Sexual and Civil Rights: Re-Imagining 
Anti-Discrimination Laws, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 565, 567 (2000). 
Hunter suggests that progress in equality rights is a product of movements and 
campaigns that in turn establish the cultural dynamics of equality statutes. Id. 
She further states that “[w]hen legislatures extend the civil rights model to a 
new group, a powerful sense of social legitimacy is conferred. This sense of 
legitimacy develops, in part, because legislation can be enacted only after the 
group has reached a certain level of social acceptance.” Id. at 567. See also 
Fogle, supra note 4, at 185-92 (discussing the relevance of gay rights 
legislation as a reflection of popular attitudes towards homosexuality). 
187 Fogle, supra note 4, at 186-87. Fogle argues that, “although the law 
cannot prohibit individual prejudice, it can prohibit discriminatory behavior . . 
. . Eradicating discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation indicates a 
compelling interest on the part of the jurisdiction adopting such a statute to 
protect the status of gays and lesbians.” Id. 
188 Id. at 192. Fogle notes that “using the legal status of a group of people 
to determine whether a statement is defamatory has been applied in other 
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Against Unlawful Discrimination is meant to have any teeth, its 
very existence must be read to indicate that residents have 
decided to treat gays, lesbians and heterosexuals equally.189 In 
short, the legislative intent is to dismiss precisely the type of 
opinions that Gray tacitly permits, if not rewards.190 Judicial 
declaration that homosexuality harms one’s reputation is 
therefore entirely antithetical to the will of the majority as 
expressed in legislation. 
2. Progressive Judicial Decisions in New Jersey Caselaw 
New Jersey caselaw simply does not support the court’s 
decision in Gray. The cases explored in this comment provide a 
brief look at the current supreme and appellate courts’ apparent 
effort to provide progressive solutions to the problems gays, 
lesbians, and transgendered people face in contemporary society. 
Taken together, they indicate the cumulative effort expended by 
New Jersey courts to combat homophobia and insure equal 
protection in the state.191 Such an effort is frustrated by the over-
simplified analysis in Gray that unnecessarily concluded that 
homosexuality is reasonably susceptible to a defamatory meaning 
because “a number of citizens still look upon homosexuality with 
                                                          
subgroups within the general population.” Id., citing Ledsinger v. Burmeister, 
318 N.W.2d 558 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that calling someone a 
“nigger” was not defamatory at all). 
189 See Petition, supra note 160, at i. This contention was one of the two 
main propositions advanced by the defendant in its petition for certification. 
The other main argument was that the appellate division misapplied the 
constitutionally imperative actual malice standard developed by the United 
States and New Jersey Supreme Courts. See id. Defendants specifically stated 
that “[i]gnoring New Jersey’s efforts to end discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation, the appellate division erred in holding that an imputation of 
homosexuality could be defamatory.” Id. at 16. 
190 Allowing a defamation plaintiff to prevail has been considered the 
equivalent of legally sanctioning the position asserted in his or her claim. See 
infra Part I (discussing dismissal of certain claims to avoid condoning 
discriminatory attitudes). 
191 See generally Fogle, supra note 4, at 186-87. 
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disfavor.”192 These cases also bolster the legislative and statutory 
analysis set forth in this comment. Taken together, they illustrate 
that the state courts acknowledge legislation as a manifestation of 
“public policy” in New Jersey, and that the highest court in the 
state takes pride in maverick decisions affording broad protection 
to gays and lesbians.193 
A common justification for exercising judicial restraint on 
policy issues is that proper redress should be achieved through 
political venues and lobbying.194 This approach may be effective 
when, for example, an individual seeks legislative change.195 
When, as in Gray, however, the applicable legal standard is a 
uniquely judicial determination,196 there is perhaps no alternate 
means to affect the desired change.197 Thus, even lesbians and 
gays who are active in legislative lobbying and advocacy groups 
must presumptively stand idly by while courts sanction an 
individual’s estimation of homosexuality as a negative 
characteristic.198 
                                                          
192 Gray v. Press Communications, LLC, 775 A.2d 678, 682 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
193 See supra Part II (discussing New Jersey cases and legislation that 
further equal protection for gays and lesbians in the state). 
194 One argument is that substantive changes in the law should be 
achieved through the political process rather than by judicial fiat. See, e.g., 
Patrice S. Arend, Defamation in an Age of Political Correctness: Should a 
False Public Statement That a Person Is Gay Be Defamatory?, 18 N. ILL. U. 
L. REV. 99, 114 (1997) (arguing that “[a]s society ‘evolves’ and recognizes 
that homosexuality is not offensive, fewer cases will be brought to the courts . 
. . . This allows the law to change gradually to serve the role of stimulating 
social change, while at the same time doing what it is intended to do—protect 
people.”). 
195 This approach may be effective in cases where the desired remedy is 
repealing, altering or amending an act of legislation. However, as noted, New 
Jersey’s defamation law is not codified in statute and is therefore governed by 
common law ideals and decisional law. See supra Part I.B. 
196 See supra Part I.B (noting that it is for the court to determine whether 
a communication is reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning). 
197 Whether or not a plaintiff is allowed to proceed with a defamation 
claim is discretionary by the court. See supra Part I.B. 
198 As previously discussed, the court determines whether a statement is 
defamatory as a threshold issue. See supra Part I.B. Because this decision will 
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The New Jersey defamation law is not codified in a statute, 
and is therefore uniquely amenable to judicial revisions.199 This 
places an additional burden on courts to be more careful when 
determining whether a statement is defamatory. The appellate 
court in Gray had a real opportunity to inject an element of badly 
needed intellectual rigor into caselaw on defamation. In an area 
of the law containing “such anomalies and absurdities for which 
no legal writer has had a kind word,”200 this would have been a 
service not only to the state of New Jersey, but also to other 
jurisdictions that may eventually have to decide the same issue.201 
The decisions of other state courts that have casually interpreted 
homosexuality in defamation cases could, therefore, mean 
essentially nothing. 
To be sure, some courts have not been eager to validate 
progressive points of view in cases dealing with homosexuality.202 
However, as noted above, New Jersey courts have certainly not 
been adverse to rejecting out-of-state decisions construing 
identical questions pertaining to sexual orientation.203 There is, 
                                                          
be made based on the judgment of the court, it is distinctly unlike legislative 
initiatives and enactments, which may be affected by political lobbying and 
voting constituent groups. 
199 See supra Part I.B (explaining that New Jersey’s defamation law is 
governed by common law ideals and judicial decree). 
200 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 771-72. 
201 As noted, courts and commentators agree that defamation standards 
change from one generation to the next. Some commentators have projected 
that the time will arrive when stating that someone is gay or lesbian does not 
reflect negatively upon their reputation. See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 11, at 
35; Arend, supra note 194, at 114 (stating that “as the gay community 
becomes even more visible and achieves greater political power, the stigma 
attached to homosexuality will undoubtedly disappear”). 
202 See, e.g., supra notes 71-72 (citing cases which have found imputation 
of homosexuality to be defamatory). 
203 By the time Dale was litigated, other jurisdictions had applied narrow 
definitions to public accommodation laws and found that the Boy Scouts did 
not constitute a “place of public accommodation.” See Welsh v. Boy Scouts of 
Am., 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993), aff’g 787 F. Supp. 1511 (N.D. Ill. 
1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1012 (1993); Randall v. Orange County 
Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 261 (Cal. 1998); Curran v. Mount 
Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998); 
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therefore, no reason why the New Jersey court should act as 
though it is not in a position to be selective and judgmental when 
it comes to accepting social prejudices. By treating as self-evident 
that being falsely called a lesbian may be harmful to one’s 
reputation, the Gray court implicitly condones homophobia.204 
Sound judicial discretion should be applied to ensure that 
defamation decisions comply with the state’s public policy. Given 
that the current trend of the New Jersey courts is to liberally 
construe state laws to provide legal redress to those who suffer 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, Gray was inconsistent 
and should have been reversed. 
3.  The Many Shades of Gray 
To the extent that implications can be drawn from Gray, one 
must consider the standards required to sustain a defamation 
action as set forth above in conjunction with the role of judicial 
                                                          
Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc. v. Comm’n on Human Rights 
and Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352 (Conn. 1987); Seabourn v. Coronado Area 
Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 891 P.2d 385 (Kan. 1995); Schwenk v. Boy 
Scouts of Am., 551 P.2d 465 (Or. 1976). See also Erica L. Stringer, Has the 
Supreme Court Created a Constitutional Shield for Private Discrimination 
Against Homosexuals? A Look at the Future Ramifications of Boy Scouts of 
Am. v. Dale, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 181, 183-84 (2001). In an analysis of the 
future impacts of Dale on American constitutional litigations, the author noted 
the following: 
 The Boy Scouts of America [“BSA”] has faced numerous court 
challenges to its exclusionary membership policies under state public 
accommodations laws. Through these challenges, brought on behalf 
of girls, atheists, and homosexuals, four state supreme courts and the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit have held that BSA is 
not a place of public accommodation. In a groundbreaking decision, 
however, the Supreme Court of New Jersey departed from these 
decisions in unanimously holding that BSA does fall within the scope 
of New Jersey’s LAD. 
Id. 
204 In the same manner that upholding a defamation claim that a white 
person is African-American would sanction racist beliefs, judicial recognition 
of defamation suits based on an imputation of homosexuality sanctions 
homophobia. See generally Fogle, supra note 4, at 176. 
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discretion.205 The thrust of this analysis concludes that allowing 
defamation suits of this nature is tantamount to declaring 
homosexuality offensive; it permits juries to award damages on a 
necessary presumption that one is damaged by such 
imputations.206 This position has been suggested elsewhere,207 
though this comment takes a moderate view concluding that 
“depriving individuals of a tort remedy for defamation is an 
inappropriate and inefficient method for changing public attitudes 
about homosexuality.”208 It should be noted, however, that 
caselaw and legislation within a specific jurisdiction may indicate 
a public acceptance of homosexuality that negates a finding that 
one is injured when publicly labeled as homosexual.209 Therefore, 
in jurisdictions where the conditions of the latter proposition are 
met, pro-active judicial decisions in defamation suits are neither 
unwarranted nor unprecedented.210 
                                                          
205 See supra Parts II.A, II.B, II.D for the applicable legal standards in 
defamation actions, New Jersey’s statutory and common law requirements, 
and judicial discretion in determining whether a defamation claim is 
cognizable. 
206 See supra Part II.A (explaining that defamatory statements are those 
that harm one’s reputation). 
207 See Arend, supra note 194, at 111. 
208 Id. at 113-14. 
209 Fogle, supra note 4, at 176. Fogle utilized a comparison between 
statements that a white person is African-American and those labeling a 
heterosexual as homosexual. He noted the following: 
 [T]he two examples differ in the degree to which society has 
determined to treat people of color and gays equally. In the first 
instance, equal protection laws have been established throughout the 
nation to protect employment, housing, and other rights. Such laws 
concerning gays and lesbians are largely absent at the federal level 
and local protection varies greatly in different regions of the country. 
Therefore, it would not be logical to treat allegations that someone is 
white the same way as allegations that someone is not heterosexual, 
except where the jurisdiction has adopted a similar attitude regarding 
the two populations.  
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
210 Additionally, because decisions in defamation suits inherently reflect 
the competing policy tensions between one’s desire to protect his or her 
reputation and society’s interest in protecting First Amendment rights, the fact 
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At least one commentator has argued that courts should never 
deny economic recovery to those who consider themselves 
harmed by an accusation of homosexuality.211 Such a bright-line 
rule, however, unnecessarily overlooks affirmative steps taken by 
a particular jurisdiction’s legislative and judicial systems to 
expunge the legal system of discriminatory treatment of gays and 
lesbians.212 Further, such a rule neglects the fact that merely 
allowing homosexuality to remain on the list of legally 
“offensive” terms may have a deleterious effect upon how the 
community at large views gays and lesbians.213 Finally, because 
plaintiffs who bring defamation suits are not necessarily 
motivated by financial factors, a court that dismisses a 
defamation suit does not always risk leaving a person financially 
damaged.214 
The court’s conclusion in Gray has far-reaching effects upon 
                                                          
that plaintiffs in defamation suits tend to have non-economic motives should be 
carefully considered. See Boies, supra note 47, at 1298. 
211 Arend, supra note 194, at 114. 
212 See supra Parts I and II for analysis of relevant New Jersey legislation 
and caselaw. 
213 See generally Ryan Goodman, Beyond the Enforcement Principle: 
Sodomy Laws, Social Norms, and Social Panoptics, 89 CAL. L. REV. 643 
(2001). Similar arguments have been made about the impact of “unenforced” 
sodomy laws upon a community’s treatment of homosexuals. Goodman 
borrowed from sociolegal studies of law founded in constitutive theories and 
analyzed the ways in which sodomy laws “operate in daily life by shaping 
interpersonal relations, influencing daily habits and helping define civic 
identity.” Id. at 666. 
214 Boies, supra note 47, at 1298-99. 
 Defamation actions, particularly those that involve individuals, 
usually have strong noneconomic motives. Defamation litigation 
usually arises when someone is hurt. They are hurt and they are 
angry. They may or may not have suffered a calculable economic 
loss, but they are often going to be less motivated by that loss, and 
less constrained by the economic costs of litigation, than most 
potential plaintiffs. 
Id. But see Post, supra note 32, at 694. In expounding upon the “reputation as 
property” theory of defamation law, Post points out that perhaps “the value of 
reputation is determined by the marketplace in exactly the same manner that 
the marketplace determines the cash value of any property loss.” Id. 
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all individuals who attribute to themselves the status of being a 
homosexual.215 While the defendant in Gray referred to Starr as 
“the lesbian cowgirl,” he did not claim that she engaged in 
homosexual acts, frequented gay bars or even affiliated herself 
with openly gay individuals.216 This is a decidedly status-based 
imputation, distinct from a public statement that one engages in 
specific, possibly reprehensible, or even criminal acts.217 Further, 
New Jersey’s high court has recognized that homosexuality is a 
trait inseparable from personal identity.218  Therefore, regardless 
of how lawfully or respectfully an individual may conduct him or 
herself, Gray has the practical effect of hanging a label of 
opprobrium upon the entire class of individuals who identify 
themselves as homosexual.219 Put another way, Gray provides 
                                                          
215 See generally Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1548 (D. Kan. 1991) 
(stating that discrimination against immutable characteristics such as 
homosexuality will cause “significant damage to the individual’s sense of 
self”). 
216 Interestingly, if the defendant had stated that Ms. Starr was affiliated 
with gay individuals or organizations, this would have been true and therefore 
not actionable as defamatory because, as noted, Ms. Starr admitted that she 
appeared in Philadelphia Gay Pride Parade and in the accompanying outdoor 
festival. See supra note 132. 
217 Some courts have noted this status-act distinction. See, e.g., Donovan 
v. Fiumara, 442 S.E.2d 572 (N.C. 1994) (claiming falsely that plaintiffs were 
gay or bisexual did not carry with it an automatic reference to any particular 
activity and therefore was not tantamount to charging that individual with the 
commission of a crime under state sodomy law sufficient for classification as 
defamatory per se); Moricoli v. Schwartz, 361 N.E.2d 74 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) 
(stating that defendant’s reference to plaintiff as a “fag” could reasonably only 
be interpreted to assert plaintiff was homosexual and statement therefore did 
not import commission of homosexual acts). See also MAYER, supra note 10, 
at 35 (“A charge of child abuse, molestation or rape involves distinguishable 
criminal conduct or a decidedly loathsome character and must remain a proper 
subject for relief.”). 
218 See In re J.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) 
As early as 1976, New Jersey’s high court recognized that a person’s sex or 
sexuality embraces an individual’s gender, one’s self-image, and his or her 
deep psychological or emotional sense of sexual identity and character. Id. 
219 See Peck v. Tribune, 214 U.S. 185 (1909) (holding that words that 
impute conduct calculated to injure a plaintiff in the eyes of a considerable and 
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legal permission to condemn any individual who identifies herself 
as homosexual on the basis of her status alone. 
To better understand the impact of Gray, one should engage 
in an intellectual exercise. First, note that statements are only 
actionable as defamatory if they are false.220 It is self evident, 
then, that an individual who has openly acknowledged him or 
herself as gay or lesbian could not maintain a defamation action 
for public statements referring to him or her as such, regardless 
of any real or actual harm to their reputation.221 At first glance, 
this seems a simple conclusion. In light of Gray, however, 
openly gay individuals in New Jersey must now live not only 
without legal recourse to redeem their potentially damaged 
reputation, but must also accept the fact that society can, with the 
blessing of the court, view their status as gay as less than 
desirable. In fact, no matter how much pride a gay or lesbian 
person takes in his or her identity, judicial decree now tells all 
homosexuals in New Jersey that revealing their sexual orientation 
may lower their reputation in the minds of respectable members 
of the community.222 Gray effectively relegates gays and lesbians 
                                                          
respectable class of the community, though not in the eyes of the whole 
community, are libelous). 
220 Truth is an affirmative defense to defamation. LAURENCE ELDREDEGE, 
THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 323 (1977). See also 22 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of 
Facts § 305 (1993) (noting that a publication must contain a false statement of 
fact to give rise to liability for defamation). 
221 An individual who has previously stated or admitted his or her 
homosexuality would have disclosed it as fact, thus precluding him or her 
from bringing a cause of action against one who would publish an imputation 
of his or her homosexuality, because only false statements are defamatory. See 
id.; see also Hein v. Lacy, 616 P.2d 277 (Kan. 1980) (finding statements that 
the plaintiff favored the legalization of homosexuality and the 
decriminalization of marijuana not defamatory because they were substantially 
true inasmuch as they reflected plaintiff’s voting record as a state senator). 
222 See Fogle, supra note 4, at 173. One of the limitations on the law of 
defamation is that a statement is only deemed defamatory “if it prejudices a 
person in the eyes of a substantial number of ‘right-minded’ people.” Id. 
Fogle uses the analogy of racial or ethnic remarks to illustrate that by 
dismissing certain defamation claims courts may “implicitly [label] racists as 
‘wrong-thinking.’” Id. 
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in a position of political and legal second-class citizenship. 
Cast in this light, the practical effects and future impact of 
Gray can be fully examined. First, to the extent that Gray offers 
protection to anyone, it is only to those members of society who 
consider themselves defamed by a label of homosexuality.223 
Obviously, however, a plaintiff’s reputation “could only be 
injured in the eyes of homophobic individuals.”224 In the event 
that a heterosexual in New Jersey wishes to redeem his or her 
reputation by removing the stigma of homosexuality, he or she 
may do so. This may be considered a rare event, given that in the 
history of New Jersey’s courts such an action has been before the 
court only once.225 Homosexuals, however, may live their entire 
adult lives identifying themselves as gay, lesbian, bi-sexual or 
transgendered.226 The damage done to the psyche of those who 
have already “come out” in a community is far more enduring 
than to those who are subject to a single, false statement that they 
are gay or lesbian.227 Similarly, finding that homosexuality as a 
status is defamatory may deter people from privately, let alone 
publicly, acknowledging their homosexuality.228 
                                                          
223 This logically comports with the analysis laid out above, that plaintiffs 
in defamation suits are not primarily motivated by financial desires, but rather 
are seeking to clear their reputation of an allegedly defamatory implication. 
An individual would necessarily have to consider his or her reputation harmed 
to be motivated to sue in the first instance. See supra note 214 and 
accompanying text. See also, Fogle, supra note 4, at 176. 
224 Fogle, supra note 4, at 176; see also, Lidsky, supra note 8, at 34. 
225 This is true at least with respect to New Jersey appellate courts with 
reported decisions, inasmuch as this was a question of first impression before 
the Gray court. See supra note 157. 
226 The mutability of sexual orientation has been the subject of numerous 
legal, medical and academic studies. This comments restricts analysis to those 
who have publicly acknowledged their sexual orientation as other than 
heterosexual. 
227 See, e.g., Janet Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Toward Equal 
Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915 
(1989); see also Leslie, supra note 1, at 105. 
228 Halley, supra note 227, at 945-46 (“The legal and social burdens 
imposed on homosexual identity deter individuals whose desires and behavior 
are entirely or partially homosexual from acknowledging that fact.”). 
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In a legal context, because a statement that one is homosexual 
is actionable as defamatory when false, defamation law provides 
harbor only for those willing to publicly denounce and litigate 
against such a statement.229 While this legal consequence may be 
correct in suggesting that those who disclose their homosexuality 
do not regard it as harming their reputation, practically speaking, 
it leaves only two options for self-identified homosexuals: they 
must either (1) acknowledge and subjectively regard their 
homosexuality as degrading or (2) hide it.230 This not only places 
a premium on heterosexuality, but simultaneously functions as 
legal deterrant for those who wish to be openly gay. It is easy to 
see, then, that while other groups are free to promulgate hatred 
through spreading lies that a heterosexual is gay, gays and 
lesbians have very little opportunity to expunge their own 
identities of this judicially-imposed pejorative meaning.231 It has 
been noted that, because of harsh societal penalties, many 
homosexual persons conceal their sexual orientation.232 
Accordingly, the Gray rule may have the practical effect of 
politically silencing gays and lesbians, as it results in the removal 
of homosexuals from open political activity.233 This would only 
diminish any perspective or sensitivity by the heterosexual 
majority for concerns of the homosexual community.234 Given 
that the New Jersey legislature has explicitly encouraged gays 
and lesbians to participate in the state’s political forum, it is hard 
                                                          
229 As noted in supra note 220, truth is an affirmative defense to 
defamation. Furthermore, although anyone may consider his or her reputation 
to have been harmed by a statement, it is self-evident that no one is required to 
litigate. 
230 This sort of “rock and a hard place” analysis has been noted by at least 
one commentator with regard to government policy of firing all homosexuals. 
See Halley, supra note 227, at 957, construing Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d 1508 
(D.C. Cir. 1986), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, sub nom, 
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988). 
231 See Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1550 (D. Kan. 1991) (stating 
that homosexuals face severe limitations on their ability to protect their 
interests by means of the political process). 
232 Halley, supra note 227, at 957. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
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to imagine that this effect is desired. 235 
Additionally, inasmuch as Gray legally sanctions negative 
perceptions of gays and lesbians, it also implicitly tolerates, and 
may well foster, homophobia in New Jersey.236 Though 
defamation is a civil wrong and does not carry the impact of 
attributing criminal status to a class of individuals, the fact 
remains that judicial determinations in defamation suits 
unequivocally label certain acts or classes of people as 
undesirable.237 Allowing homosexuality to remain on the list of 
“legally offensive” terms may prevent gays and lesbians from 
reporting bias or hate crimes against them.238 In a jurisdiction that 
has articulated an interest in protecting homosexuals from this 
very type of isolation, it is antithetical for a court to declare that 
one person’s legally protected, public acknowledgement of 
homosexuality is another’s cause for a lawsuit. 
Further, the harmful seeds sowed by judicial decree in 
defamation suits have especially subversive results because, 
unlike anti-gay legislation or active discrimination by specific 
organizations, a judicial declaration that attaches stigma to a 
particular class cannot be redacted by political lobbying or 
advocacy.239 Gay rights organizations have successfully affected 
                                                          
235 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:9DD-8 (West 2002) (stating that the Human 
Relations Council “shall consist of an executive committee which shall include 
ten public members who shall be representative of the various ethnic; 
religious; national origin; racial; sexual orientation; gender; and disabilities 
organizations in the State”). 
236 In the same manner that finding racial comments actionable as 
defamatory has been considered as sanctioning racism, homophobia is 
implicitly tolerated, if not affirmed, by finding an imputation of homosexuality 
defamatory. See Fogle, supra note 4, at 174. 
237 See Arend, supra note 194, at 112. Inasmuch as criminal statutes have 
the immediate effect of denoting certain acts as “criminal,” civil laws and tort 
claims function to make the injured party whole. Id. Arend argued that tort 
law is not properly employed as a mechanism to change social attitudes. See 
id. (“Depriving individuals of a tort remedy for defamation is an inappropriate 
and inefficient method for changing public attitudes about homosexuality. The 
role of tort law is to make the injured whole, not to change social mores.”). 
238 See Halley, supra note 227, at 957. 
239 See supra Part I.B (noting that the only statutes governing the law of 
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legislative approaches to numerous causes in New Jersey.240 As 
noted, the legislative and judicial branches of the state 
government have been receptive to passing and interpreting laws 
so as not to advance discriminatory attitudes or initiatives.241 
Defamation law, however, is unique because there is not, and 
perhaps cannot be, a mechanism to attack the discrimination that 
it undoubtedly fosters.242 In a single decision, Gray now 
effectively provides the legal legs upon which individuals who 
wish to advance anti-gay and homophobic agendas may stand. 
Because control over the boundaries of defamatory categories is 
placed in the hands of judges, only a decree from the bench can 
eradicate the myriad, pervasive effects of Gray.243 
                                                          
defamation in New Jersey pertain to retraction and pleading requirements). 
240 Numerous groups are active in lobbying for gay rights and electing 
officials supportive of gay and lesbian initiatives in New Jersey. For examples 
of state and local organizations and their political efforts, see e.g., New Jersey 
Stonewall Democrats, at http://www.geocities.com/njstoned/WTC.html (out-
lining mission statement of coalition of lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgendered individuals effecting change within the state Democratic Party) 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2002); New Jersey Lesbian and Gay Coalition, at 
http://www.njlgc.org (detailing efforts of non-profit organization committed to 
sexual orientation-based discrimination through public advocacy, education, 
political action and legal reform) (last visited Mar. 24, 2002); Gay and 
Lesbian Political Action and Support Groups, at http://www.gaypasg.org/ 
Projects/STOP%20HARASSMENT%20AND%20BULLYINg.htm (outlining 
work done to pass bills in the New Jersey Senate and Assembly that would 
implement sexual orientation provisions of the state’s LAD to further safe 
schools and community violence prevention by requiring school districts to 
adopt harassment and bullying prevention) (last visited Mar. 24, 2002). 
241 See supra Parts I.E.1, I.E.2 (examining New Jersey legislation and 
caselaw relevant to sexual orientation). 
242 Courts do not recognize a cause of action where the allegedly 
defamatory statement is directed at a group. See, e.g., Neiman Marcus v. 
Lait, 13 F.R.D. 311, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (“Where the group or class 
disparaged is a large one, absent circumstances pointing to a particular 
plaintiff as the person defamed, no individual member of the group or class 
has a cause of action.”) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 564(c)). 
243 As noted in supra Part I.B., it is for the court to determine whether a 
statement is defamatory in the first instance. 
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III.  A MORE COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL: SHEDDING LIGHT IN A 
GRAY AREA 
Although courts in the United States are divided as to whether 
a false imputation of homosexuality is defamatory per se or 
defamatory per quod,244 no court has concluded that an accusation 
of homosexuality is not actionable under any circumstance.245 A 
recent case from New South Wales, Australia, Rivkin v. 
Amalgamated Television Services, however, concluded that a jury 
is no longer allowed to decide on the defamatory character of 
imputations that a person may be homosexual.246 While this 
opinion is from an international jurisdiction, the mechanisms 
applied by the court are enlightening. Rivkin referred to the 
framework of state and federal legislative provisions to determine 
the community’s view on homosexuality.247 Significantly, the 
legislation presently in place in New Jersey nearly mirrors that of 
the jurisdiction in Rivkin.248 Unlike the Gray court, the Rivkin 
                                                          
244 Defamation per se is “a statement that is defamatory in and of itself 
and is not capable of an innocent meaning.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 427 
(7th ed. 1999). Defamation per quod is a statement that that “either (1) is not 
apparent but is proved by extrinsic evidence showing its injurious meaning or 
(2) is apparent but is not a statement that is actionable per se.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 427 (7th ed. 1999). 
245 See supra Part I.C (reviewing caselaw finding imputations of 
homosexuality to be either defamatory per se or per quod). 
246 Rivkin v. Amalgamated Television Servs. Pty. Ltd., 2001 NSW 
LEXIS 432 (N.S. W. S. Ct. 2001). 
247 Id. at *5. Specifically, the court noted that the former proscription of 
homosexual conduct between consenting males adults was abolished by 
amendment in 1984. The Anti-Discrimination Act includes unlawful 
discrimination on the grounds of homosexuality in a wide range of contexts 
and includes a provision making it unlawful to incite hatred towards, serious 
contempt for, or severe ridicule of a person on the grounds of homosexuality. 
The Property (Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act broadened the 
definition of “de facto relationship” to include homosexual relationships, thus 
providing for court orders adjusting property rights between homosexual 
couples upon the termination of a domestic relationship. Id. 
248 See supra Parts I, II. For a comprehensive overview and state-by-state 
comparative analysis of New Jersey’s laws on sexuality-related topics, readers 
are encouraged to examine Overview of State Sexuality Laws generated by the 
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court found that “it is no longer open to contend that the shared 
social and moral standards with which the ordinary reasonable 
member of the community is imbued include that of holding 
homosexual men . . . in lesser regard on account of that fact 
alone.”249 The facts underlying Rivkin are distinguishable, but the 
court’s conclusion and analysis are instructive.250 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey recently stated, “the 
human price of this bigotry has been enormous. At a most 
fundamental level, adherence to the principle of equality demands 
that our legal system protect the victims of invidious 
discrimination.”251 It would seem reasonable to conclude, 
therefore, that the court is amenable to progressive solutions like 
those employed in Rivkin to cure social ills. At a minimum, the 
state courts have acknowledged the legal impact upon the 
political and social reality of what it means to be an openly gay 
individual. The court should have utilized existing legislation and 
                                                          
Sexuality Information and Education Council of the United States (SIECUS), 
available at http://www.siecus.org/policy/states (last visited Mar. 11, 2002). 
249 Rivkin, 2001 NSW LEXIS at *7 (emphasis added). The court allowed 
plaintiff to re-plead his case, and submitted to the jury an amended contention 
that defendant had abused his position of power in an employee-employer 
relation by engaging in a homosexual affair with a third party. Id. 
250 Id. at *1-2. The defendant in Rivkin was responsible for airing a 
television broadcast that suggested the plaintiff was criminally liable for the 
death of a woman who was the partner of a man the program alleged to be 
engaged in a homosexual relationship with the plaintiff. Id. Based on the 
broadcast, Mr. Rivkin sued the television station. In addition to the imputation 
of homosexuality, he pled that three additional imputations in the program 
were defamatory. Id. The court acknowledged defendant’s challenge to the 
charges involving homosexuality as the following: 
 [U]ntil relatively recent times the charge that a man had had 
homosexual intercourse with another would, without more, have been 
capable of being defamatory of him. However, [defendant] submitted 
that there had been a change in the social and moral standards of the 
community such that, as a matter of law, it could not be said that 
right thinking members of the society generally would hold that the 
mere fact of homosexual intercourse lowered a man in their estimate. 
Id. at *5. The plaintiff successfully pled that various other imputations within 
the television broadcast should be submitted to the jury. Id. 
251 Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1227 (N.J. 1999). 
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recent caselaw as a reflection of community and legal values to 
determine that an imputation of homosexuality is actionable as 
defamatory. 
CONCLUSION 
It is widely accepted that defamation law is an odd and 
confusing conglomeration of varying standards and procedures.252 
Rather than lending reason and clarity to the realm of defamation 
law, Gray has the dubious distinction of further muddying the 
“intellectual wasteland” of inconsistent rulings and unenlightened 
decisions.253 While commentators urge for closer judicial scrutiny 
to prevent abuse of defamation law, Gray clearly overlooked the 
need for legal reform.254 The Supreme Court of New Jersey 
should have re-examined Gray to insure that judicial decisions 
are consistent with the broader efforts of the legal system. 
Similarly, the social phenomenon of homophobia cannot 
feasibly be attributed to a single source.255 A reconsideration of 
Gray would have effectuated the court’s articulated goal of 
expunging society of sexual orientation-based discrimination. 
Some commentators have expressed expectation, and even hope, 
that homosexuality will one day go the path of other categories 
into the annals of defamatory anachronisms.256 No court in the 
United States has risen to the challenge.257 The Supreme Court of 
                                                          
252 See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 771-72. 
253 See Post, supra note 32, at 691. 
254 MAYER, supra note 11, at 214 (stating that “courts must be tough in 
defining defamatory language to prevent abuse of the law . . . . Short of false 
and malicious statements clearly causing actual damages many defamation 
cases could well be summarily dismissed.”). 
255 See generally Leslie, supra note 1, at 105. 
256 See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 11, at 35; Arend, supra note 194, at 
114; Fogle, supra note 4, at 166; Lidsky, supra note 8, at 36. 
257 See, e.g., Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1991) (holding that allegation of homosexuality is not slander per se and 
questioning, in dicta, whether such allegation should even be defamatory at 
all); see generally, 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 199 (1995) 
(articulating the various positions taken by state and federal courts, all of 
which held that imputations of homosexuality are either defamatory per se or 
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New Jersey stood in the unique position to provide substantial 
and effective analysis to this question.258 This comment does not 
suggest that a reversal of Gray would have erased homophobia 
from the fabric of society, or even from the state of New Jersey. 
A more enlightened analysis of the policy issues at stake in Gray, 
however, may have provided grounds for a reversal, which 
would have been a step in the direction of removing the scourge 
of sexual orientation based discrimination.259 In light of current 
legislation and the strongly worded decisions previously rendered 
by New Jersey courts, it is lamentable that the archaic conclusion 
of Gray was allowed to stand. 
 
                                                          
per quod). 
258 The petition for certification of the appellate court’s decision was 
denied. See supra note 156. 
259 Leslie, supra note 1, at 105. 
